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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Issue: Did the trial court err in allowing defendants to allege that plaintiffs

had not filed their Verified Complaint or their Amended Complaint within the 30-day
time limitation outlined in the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001, although
defendants had not pleaded waiver or statute of limitations in their Answer?
2.

Issue: Does the trial court's failure to articulate a true basis for summary

judgment require reversal?
3.

Issue: Did the trial court err in apparently concluding that the decision

regarding the vacation of North Union Avenue was not "rendered" until the County
Commission adopted and published the "corrected" vacation ordinance No. 1275, in
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August, 1994?
4.

Issue: Did the trial court err in dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' claims

relating to Ordinance No. 1275, after apparently concluding that the decision regarding
the vacation of North Union Avenue was not rendered until the County Commission
adopted and published the "corrected" vacation ordinance No. 1275, in August, 1994?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment presents for review conclusions of
law only, because, by definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual issues, this
court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without according deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions." Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989); Madsen
v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988); Daniels v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan
Assn.. 771 P.2d 1100, 1101-1102 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989).
"This same lack of deference applies to the trial court's interpretation of statutes, which
likewise poses a question of law." Bonham. 788 P.2d at 499; accord Asay v. Watkins,
751 P.2d 1135, 1136 (Utah 1988).
This Court is to view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
appellants. See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving. Inc. v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382
(Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Ann. §17-27-808 to 810 (1994); Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001 (1994);
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Nos. 8,12, 52 (1994) [Copies of these provisions of law
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and rules of procedure are included in the Addendum as Exhibits A, B and C,
respectively.]
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 25, 1995, the Salt Lake County Commission voted to vacate or close all
of North Union Avenue between 1000 East and 1300 East, the county road which was and
is the sole access to plaintiffs' property and the two homes on that property. R. 476-480,
516. [A map showing the configuration of the streets and property at issue in the instant
case is attached hereto as Exhibit D of the Addendum.] This action was taken at the
request of Hermes Associates, a development company which was building a shopping
center/redevelopment project in the area. R. 489-491.

Shortly thereafter, defendants

closed this road to public travel. R. 517. [The factual and legal history of this project is
more fiilly set forth in Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County. 913 P.2d
723, 727 (Utah 1995), a copy of which is included in the Addendum of this brief as
Exhibit E.]
On June 20, 1994, plaintiffs filed suit under Utah Code Ann. §17-27-808 to 810
(1994) and Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 (1994), alleging that the vacation of their public
right-of way was illegal, and seeking injunctive relieffromthe court. R. 1-22, 29-34. On
July 7, 1994, the Court heard plaintiffs9 motion for injunctive relief and denied the same.
R. 748A, et. seq. At that hearing, defendants did not allege that plaintiffs' complaint was
not filed timely, nor did they allege that the decision to vacate/close North Union Avenue
had not yet been rendered. Instead, they argued that the decision had been made legally,
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and offered as evidence a draft of the unsigned vacation ordinance [R. 68-69],
photographs of the closed road [R. 796-798], and testimony that the road vacation would
not affect access to plaintiffs' property.[R. 798-799]
Beginning in June, 1994, defendants allowed Hermes to tear out North Union
Avenue east of plaintiffs5 property. R. 517. On July 13, 1994, more than seven weeks
after the public hearing, defendants adopted and signed Ordinance No. 1270, the road
vacation ordinance. R. 481-485. This ordinance differed substantively from the decision
voted upon at the the May 25th hearing. Although plaintiffs had akeady filed a "petition
of review" (verified complaint) regarding the road vacation, defendants did not notify
either plaintiffs or the court of this hearing or the adoption and publication of this
ordinance.1 R. 581.
On or about July 14, 1994, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint challenging the
legality of the road vacation. R. 89-112. On July 27, 1994, defendants filed their Answer
to this Amended Complaint. R. 113-120. In this Answer, defendants did not allege that
the decision to vacate North Union Avenue had not yet been rendered, they did not
challenge the timing or manner of plaintiffs' complaint, nor did they plead as an
affirmative defense either statute of limitations or waiver.
On August 10, 1994, without notice to plaintiffs [R. 581] or the court,2 defendants
held a hearing and adopted another vacation ordinance, Ordinance No. 1275, called the
"corrected" vacation ordinance. This ordinance made technical corrections in some of the
legal descriptions used in Ordinance No. 1270. R. 481-485.

4

In January 30, 1995, the Court held a hearing to decide, inter alia, whether
plaintiffs could file a Second Amended Complaint to include allegations regarding the
County's refusal to enforce their roadway standards, zoning standards, the the express
terms of Hermes' conditional use permit. Plaintiffs also asked for damages. R. 818, et.
seq. During this hearing, defendants for the first time questioned the timeliness of
plaintiffs' challenge to the road vacation, claiming that plaintiffs should have filed their
complaint within 30 days after the adoption in August of the "corrected" vacation
ordinance, No. 1275. R. 836-838. The Court discussed this issue briefly, and then ruled
that plaintiffs could file their Second Amended Complaint as submitted. R. 294-295,
843-844.
On or about February 27, 1995, defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 326-328. On March
29, 1995, the court held a hearing on both defendants' and plaintiffs' motions. R. 859, et.
seq. Judge Iwasaki, ruling from the bench [R. 846-853], dismissed plaintiffs' complaint
without prejudice, except as to "the vacation ordinance," which Judge Iwasaki said was
subject to his "previous order." R. 851. [The Minute Entry for 3/29/95 states that the
entire matter was dismissed without prejudice. R. 637] (A copy of the Bench Ruling is
attached to the Addendum as Exhibit F.)
On April 6, 1995, defendants submitted a proposed order relating to the March
29th hearing. This order dismissed with prejudice "plaintiffs' claims as contained within
plaintiffs' second amended complaint, relating to ... ordinance number 1275 (corrected),"
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and dismissed without prejudice all of plaintiffs' "other claims as asserted in plaintiffs'
second amended complaint..." Plaintiffs filed an Objection to this order and requested a
hearing on that Objection. R. 639-641, 642-643.
On April 14, 1995, without ruling on plaintiffs' objection and without notifying
plaintiffs, the Court signed defendants' order. R. 647-649. [A copy of this Order is
included in the Addendum an Exhibit G.] The Court issued no ruling or Conclusions of
Law explaining the reason for dismissing with prejudice some of plaintiffs' claims, nor
did the Court identify with any specificity which claims were "relating to ... ordinance
number 1275 (corrected)." On May 18, 1995, by way of Minute Entry, the court denied
plaintiffs' Request for Hearing and Objection and instructed defendants' counsel to
prepare the order. R. 652-652. On September 26, 1995, the court signed the order
denying plaintiffs' Objection and Request for Hearing. R. 701-701.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs are owners of eight parcels of property and two homes located in

Union, unincorporated Salt Lake County, first platted in 1857. R. 1, 418. Since that time,
the sole access to this property and those homes has been North Union Avenue, a county
road. R. 516. That road was 33 feet wide, had been a platted road for more than 100
years, and provided plaintiffs with access to 900 East and 1300 East. R. 2. The addresses
for the two homes are 1072 East North Union Avenue and 1078 East North Union
Avenue. R. 418, 516.
2.

In 1991, Hermes proposed to the Salt Lake County Commission that they
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expand The Family Center as a redevelopment project, complete with public funding and
the use of eminent domain. Eventually, Hermes included plaintiffs' property and North
Union Avenue within the proposed boundaries of their shopping center expansion. R. 467.
3.

In February, 1994, the Commission, by a vote of 2-to-l, adopted a contract

with Hermes regarding the dispersal of lands and funding under the aegis of the
redevelopment law.

In that contract, the County Commission, sitting as the

Redevelopment Agency Board of Directors, contracted to seek the vacation of the public
rights-of way located within the redevelopment project area, including North Union
Avenue where it accessed plaintiffs' property. The contract also included a provision
requiring Hermes to defend in court all actions taken by the county which might result in
the loss of access and inverse condemnation of plaintiffs' property. R. 785.
4.

On February 15, 1994, Hermes filed a Petition for Street Vacation, seeking

the vacation of, inter alia, North Union Avenue as it accessed plaintiffs' property. R. 489.
5.

In April, 1994, the Salt Lake County Planning Commission approved a

conditional use permit for Hermes shopping center. R. 467.
6.

On May 25, 1994, defendants voted to vacate North Union Avenue between

1000 East and 1300 East, except for except a 25-foot wide portion of the road directly in
front (north) of plaintiffs' property. That 25' x 250' strip was "closed." This portion of
the road was closed rather than (totally) vacated so that title to the half of the road property
would not accrue to plaintiffs. R. 4-5, 476-480. [A copy of the minutes for this hearing
are included in the Addendum as Exhibit H.]
7.

This motion as passed included the vacation of eight feet of the public right7

of-way in front of plaintiffs' property. However, instead of that eight feet of road
accruing half to each abutting landowner, defendants specified that all eight feet would
be vacatedfromthe north side of North Union Avenue and would accrue only to Hermes.
This deprived plaintiffs of approximately 1000 square feet of property. R. 6, 476-480.
8.

This vote by the defendants created a 25 foot x 250 foot closed public

roadway that had no outlet to any other roadway. R. 5, 476-480.
9.

Plaintiffs did not receive the required notice regarding the action taken at

the May 25th hearing, nor did they receive any type of notification regarding any of the
actions subsequently taken by the Commissioners which directly affected their property.
R. 581.
10.

On or about June 20, 1994, plaintiffs filed with the trial court a complaint

which, inter alia, alleged that the vacation ordinance adopted by the Commission was
illegal as to the actions taken regarding plaintiffs' property and the easement and access
thereto. R. 1-22. The complaint also asked the court to review the question of access to
plaintiffs' property, and further asked the court to enjoin defendants from vacating the
road until the question of reasonable ingress and egress could be decided. After plaintiffs
filed this complaint, defendants did not inform either plaintiffs or the court that they had
not yet signed an ordinance and did not allege that plaintiffs' complaint (petition for
review) was not filed timely or properly. In fact, defendants argued that the vacation
ordinance was legal, and included a copy of the unsigned ordinance as evidence. R. 6869.
11.

On or about June 24, 1994, defendants, by way of letter, tendered defense
8

of this lawsuit and of the County's actions to Hermes Associates. Subsequently, Hermes'
attorney, Nick Colessides, who had represented Hermes throughout the redevelopment
and planning and zoning processes, made an appearance as counsel for the County and
the individual Commissioners. R. 785.
12.

Starting in June, 1994, defendants allowed Hermes and their representatives

to block off and tear out North Union Avenue east of plaintiffs' property. R. 517.
13.

On or about July 7, 1994, the court heard plaintiffs' motion for an

injunction and denied the same. R. 748A, et. seq. The court stated that this denial was
based solely on plaintiffs' failure to show evidence of irreparable harm, and that the
ruling was not a reflection on the merits of the complaint. R. 750. At that hearing,
defendants did not allege that plaintiffs' complaint was not filed timely, nor did they
allege that the decision to vacate/close North Union Avenue had not yet been rendered.
Instead, they argued that the decision had been made legally, and offered as evidence a
draft of the unsigned vacation ordinance [R. 68-69], photographs of the closed road [R.
796-798], and testimony that the road vacation would not adversely affect access to
plaintiffs' property. R. 798-799.
14.

On July 13, 1994, more than seven weeks after voting on the

vacation/closure, defendants held a hearing and voted to sign and publish Ordinance No.
1270, vacating or closing North Union Avenue. R. 481-485. This ordinance was
substantively different from the action voted on by the Commission on May 25th in that
it established a 25-foot public right-of-way to the "south" [west] of plaintiffs' property,
rather than a private shared easement as had been voted on at the May 25 hearing.
9

Although plaintiffs had akeady filed a "petition of review" (verified complaint) regarding
the road vacation, defendants did not notify either plaintiffs1 or the court of this hearing
or the adoption and publication of this ordinance. R. 581.
15.

On or about July 14, 1994, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that

continued allege the illegality of the road vacation decision as it involved plaintiffs'
easement and property, and asked the court to review the question of access to plaintiffs'
property. R. 89-112.
16.

On July 27, 1994, defendants filed their Answer to this amended complaint.

R. 113-120. In this Answer, defendants did not allege that the decision to vacate North
Union Avenue had not yet been rendered, they did not challenge the timing or manner of
plaintiffs' complaint, nor did they plead as an affirmative defense either statute of
limitations or waiver.
17.

During the last week of July, 1994, defendants took depositions from all

four plaintiffs and did not assail the timing or manner of plaintiffs' petition for review.
This is the first time plaintiffs were informed that the adopted vacation ordinance,
Ordinance No. 1270, was substantively different from the decision voted upon at the May
25, 1994 hearing. R. 552.
18.

On or about August 10, 1994, the Commission held another hearing

regarding the vacation of North Union Avenue. The Commission adopted and signed
what defendants call the "corrected Vacation Ordinance," No. 1275. R. 486-492. This
ordinance did not differ substantively in its effect on plaintiffs' access from Ordinance
No. 1270, which defendants published in July and which plaintiffs appealed. Rather, this
10

ordinance made technical corrections in some of the legal descriptions used in Ordinance
No. 1270. Plaintiffs were not notified that the County was holding another hearing on
the vacation of their road. Although plaintiffs had filed timely an amended complaint
with the trial court, and defendants had answered, neither the plaintiffs2 nor the court
were notified that defendants had signed a "corrected Vacation Ordinance." R. 552.
19.

In August and September, 1994, defendants and Hermes blocked off and

tore out North Union Avenue west of plaintiffs9 property, between 1000 East and the
northwest corner of plaintiffs' property. R. 518 They replaced North Union Avenue with
a road that did not meet the minimum standards outlined in the County's Standards for
Roadway Development. R. 463-466. This road was dedicated to the County and was
eventually designated as 1070 East. Since that time, fire trucks, garbage trucks, snow
plows and other large vehicles can't access plaintiffs' homes or property. R. 512, 518523.
20.

In October, 1994, Hermes built one of their retail buildings into the 25-foot

public right-of-way established by Ordinance Nos. 1270 and 1275. Plaintiffs, through
counsel, notified the County of this breach. R. 473-474. The County responded only that
there was a problem but refused to enforce the public right-of-way and their roadway
standards. R. 475.
21.

On December 19, 1994, plaintiffs, through counsel, served defendants with

a notice of claim regarding damages to plaintiffs caused by defendants' continuing
refusal to enforce the public right-of-way as outlined in Ordinance No. 1275 (and No.
1270). R. 493-495.
11

22.

On January 30, 1995, the court held a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for leave

to amend their complaint to include allegations regarding the County's refusal to enforce
their roadway and zoning standards and the express terms of Hermes' conditional use
permit. R. 818, et seq. During that hearing, defendants told the court that plaintiffs could
not continue to assail "the validity of the vacation ordinance" because plaintiffs had not
re-filed their amended complaint 30 days after the county signed the "Corrected Vacation
Ordinance" in August, 1994. Defendants argued that the decision to vacate North Union
Avenue was not "rendered" until defendants signed the "corrected" vacation ordinance.
R. 836-838. Notwithstanding, Judge Iwasaki ruled that plaintiffs could file the second
amended complaint as they had submitted to the court, and signed an order effecting that
ruling. R. 294-295, 843-844.
23.

On February 3, 1995, plaintiffs filed notices of claim with the County

regarding damages to plaintiffs caused by defendants' continuing refusal to enforce their
roadway and zoning standards, and the conditional use permit which the County had
issued to Hermes. R. 493-503.
24.

On February 13, 1995, plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint

which continued to allege the illegality of the road vacation as regarded plaintiffs'
property, easement and access, and continued to ask the court to review the question of
access. Plaintiffs added claims regarding defendants' failure to enforce their ordinances
and permits, and, for the first time, notified the court of plaintiffs' intention to seek both
compensatory and punitive damages. R. 296-311.
25.

On or about February 23, 1995, defendants filed an answer to plaintiffs'
12

second amended complaint. R. 312-323.
26.

On or about February 27, 1995, defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. In this pleading,
defendants argued that plaintiffs could not continue to challenge the legality of the road
vacation because they had "promised" the Court they "would not challenge the validity of
the Vacation Ordinance as passed and adopted by the Board." Defendants also argued
that plaintiffs couldn't claim damages for the actions taken by the County. R. 329-345.
27.

On March 1, 1995, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction,

asking the court to order the County Commissioners to enforce their roadway and zoning
standards and the conditional use permit granted to Hermes. Plaintiffs also asked the court
to issue an injunction against any building adjacent to plaintiffs' property until the
question of reasonable access could be reviewed by the court. R. 377-416.
28.

On March 29, 1995, the court held a hearing on both defendants' and

plaintiffs5 motions. R. 859, et. seq. At that hearing, defendants told the Court that during
the hearing on the motion to amend, Judge Iwasaki had made plaintiffs promise not to
challenge the "validity" of the "Corrected" Vacation Ordinance No. 1275, and asked the
court to dismiss the remainder of plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Judge Iwasaki, ruling from the bench [R. 846-853],
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice, except as to "the vacation ordinance,"
which Judge Iwasaki said was subject to his "previous order." R. 851. (The Minute Entry
for 3/29/95 states that the entire matter was dismissed without prejudice. R. 637)
29.

On April 6, 1995, defendants submitted a proposed order relating to the
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March 29th hearing. This order dismissed with prejudice "plaintiffs' claims as
contained within plaintiffs' second amended complaint, relating to ... ordinance number
1275 (corrected)," and dismissed without prejudice all of plaintiffs' "other claims as
asserted in plaintiffs' second amended complaint..." R. 647-649. The Court submitted
neither a ruling nor Conclusions of Law explaining the basis for dismissing certain of
plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs filed an Objection to this order and
requested a hearing on that Objection. R. 639-641, 642-643.
30.

On April 14, 1995, without ruling on plaintiffs' objection and without

notifying plaintiffs, the Court signed and entered defendants' order. R. 647-649.
31.

On May 18, 1995, by way of Minute Entry, the court denied plaintiffs'

Request for Hearing and Objection and instructed defendants' counsel to prepare the
order. R. 652-653.
32.

On September 26, 1995, the Court signed the order denying plaintiffs'

Objection and Request for Hearing. R. 701-702.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
By not pleading statute of limitations or waiver as an affirmative defense in their
Answer, defendants waived the right to challenge the timeliness of plaintiffs' complaints
regarding the vacation of North Union Avenue. Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure require
that motions resulting in the dismissal of a complaint must be made by written motion
with written notice. The trial court erred in allowing the defendants to raise the
14

timeliness defense outside the pleadings and in an untimely fashion.
POINT II
While the failure of the trial court to articulate the basis for granting summary
judgment is a violation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and may have resulted in a
denial of plaintiffs' Constitutional rights to due process and access to the courts, it may
not be necessary for the appeals court to correct this error by remanding the case to the
trial court to enter a ruling or conclusions of law. Because the issues involved in this
appeal represent questions of law only, the Court of Appeals may proceed to issue
opinions without further discussion from the trial court.
POINT in
If the Court of Appeals finds, contrary to the apparent conclusion of the trial court,
as a matter of law, that the decision to vacate North Union Avenue was "rendered" either
during the May 25, 1994 public hearing, or that the decision was rendered shortly
thereafter when defendants blocked off the road to public use and allowed Hermes to tear
out and alter the road, then plaintiffs filed their petition for review of the decision in a
timely manner, as outlined in Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001(1994). Under this finding,
the Court of Appeals should remand this case to the trial court to allow plaintiffs to
discover and present evidence and legal argument challenging the legality of the road
vacation decision.
POINT IV
If the Court of Appeals finds agrees with the trial court's apparent conclusion that,
as a matter of law, the decision to vacate North Union Avenue was not made until the
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County Commission adopted and published one or other of the road vacation ordinances,
then the decision and the ordinances are invalid as a matter of law because of the failure
of the defendants to follow the procedure for the vacation of a platted road, as outlined in
Utah Code Ann. §17-27-808, et. seq.
Under this finding, defendants illegally turned over the public right-of-way to
Hermes for destruction prior to the adoption of either of the vacation ordinances and
without having legally vacated that right-of-way, an action which nullifies the decision.
Further, defendants, inter alia, adopted and published both Ordinance No. 1270 and No.
1275 long after the 30 days allowed by Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-810(l)(a). Defendants
also failed to provide plaintiffs with any written notice of the vacation of this road, an
action which has already been ruled, by the Utah Court of Appeals, to invalidate the
vacation ordinance. [See Nelson v. Provo City. 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994), a copy of
which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit J.]
If the Court of Appeals makes the determination that the vacation of North Union
Avenue, or any other road, does not take place until the adoption and publication of the
vacation ordinance, and until abutting landowners have received written notification of
the road vacation, then the Court of Appeals should conclude that the County
Commission did not properly vacate North Union Avenue, and should, as they did in
Nelson, remand this case for further proceedings consistent with that opinion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN NOT PLEADING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR WAIVER AS AN
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN THEIR ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS'
COMPLAINT, DEFENDANTS WAIVED THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE
THE TIMELINESS OF PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR REVIEW
[COMPLAINT] REGARDING THE COMMISSION'S DECISION TO
VACATE NORTH UNION AVENUE.
While the basis for the trial court's ruling dismissing claims relating to Ordinance
No. 1275 is not clear from the record (because the trial court indicated that the dismissal
was premised on a prior order which the court never actually made), the defendants
argued orally to the trial court that the basis for dismissing the claims was that plaintiffs
were not timely in filing their complaint because the plaintiffs did not file a new
complaint after the defendants adopted and published Ordinance No. 1275, which made
technical corrections to the prior ordinance reflecting the defendants' prior decision to
vacate the road. This argument was not raised in defendants' answer to plaintiffs'
complaints.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8 governs general rules of pleadings in civil cases.
In subsection (c), the rule provides that affirmative defenses, including the defenses of
waiver and statute of limitations, must be asserted in responsive pleadings. It states,
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of
risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel,
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches,
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as
a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice
so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper
designation.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12 similarly requires that defenses such as waiver
and statute of limitations must be raised in responsive pleadings, or in some cases in
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motions filed prior to responsive pleadings.4

Subsection (b) of rule 12 provides, in

relevant part,
... Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in
the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person,
(3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service
of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7)
failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted.
Subsection (h) of rule 12 reiterates that defenses such as waiver and statutes of
limitations are waived if not timely raised in responsive pleadings. That subsection states,
(h) Waiver of Defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections
which he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if
he has made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense
of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of
failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a
legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the
merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties
or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall
be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that
may have been received.
Utah case law has consistently held that defenses such as waiver and statute of
limitations are waived if not timely raised in responsive pleadings, and demonstrate the
trial court's error in allowing the defendants to raise this defense after filing answers to
plaintiffs amended complaints without raising such a defense. See American Coal Co. v.
Sandstrom 689 P.2d 1, 4 and n.7 (Utah 1984)("Statutes of limitation are not jurisdictional
and can be waived.")(footnote citing Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) omitted); Staker
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v. Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co.. 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983)("The statute of
limitations defense must be pleaded as an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading, or
it is waived, Utah R.Ci.P. 8(c) and 12(h), unless an amended pleading asserting the
defense is allowed pursuant to the requirements of Rule 15(a)."); Bezner v. Continental
Dry Cleaners. Inc.. 548 P.2d 898, 901 and nn. 4 and 5 (Utah 1976)("[T]he matter of
waiver is ordinarily an affirmative defense which should be pleaded, or the waiver itself
is deemed to be waived.")(footnotes citing rules 8(c) and 12(h) omitted).
In the instant case, plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint and an Amended
Complaint challenging the legality of the decision to vacate plaintiffs' road. Both
plaintiffs and defendants conducted discovery and filed various motions. In the middle of
a hearing to amend their complaint to include actions taken by the County Commission
subsequent to the decision to vacate the road, defendants, without making a written
motion and without providing notice to either plaintiffs or the court, suddenly argued that
the decision to vacate the road had not filed their complaint in a timely fashion. Plaintiffs
were given no opportunity to prepare for or to properly brief the court on this issue.
Given that the defendants' claim of waiver or statute of limitations was not
properly pled in their responsive pleadings, the trial court erred in allowing the defendants
to raise the defense outside the pleadings and in an untimely fashion.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ARTICULATE THE BASIS FOR
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE REMAND
BECAUSE THE APPEALS COURT MAY REVERSE THE DISMISSAL
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WITHOUT FURTHER DISCUSSION BY THE TRIAL COURT.
The trial court signed and entered an order prepared by counsel for defendants
which dismissed with prejudice all claims relating to Ordinance No. 1275, despite the fact
that the trial court had never previously ordered those claims dismissed with or without
prejudice. The only apparent basis for dismissing these claims was a purported "previous
order" which never existed. [The only Orders filed in the instant case prior to the Order
of dismissal was the Order allowing plaintiffs to file a Second Amended Complaint.] At
the hearing on the plaintiffs9 motion for leave to amend the complaint, defendants argued
something to the effect that the decision to vacate North Union Avenue was not rendered
until defendants adopted the "corrected" road vacation ordinance, Ordinance No. 1275,
more than twelve weeks after the hearing on the road vacation. Defendants suggested to
the court that plaintiffs should be prohibitedfrompursuing defects in Ordinance No. 1275,
because plaintiffs had failed to file a separate appeal after that ordinance was enacted. The
trial court discussed this argument, but deferred ruling on it. The trial court ruled only that
plaintiffs would be allowed to file their Second Amended Complaint as submitted,
including their continuing claims that the decision to and manner in which North Union
Avenue was vacated was illegal. The court then signed an order effecting that ruling.
At a subsequent hearing, the trial court ordered plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint dismissed without prejudice, requiring them to exhaust their administrative
remedies, but excepted claims regarding Ordinance No. 1275 from this ruling, indicating
that the court had already ruled on those claims. Counsel for defendants drafted an order
indicating that claims relating to Ordinance No. 1275 were dismissed with prejudice, and
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the trial court signed this order over the objection of the defendants.
The trial court's order dismissing the claims pertaining to Ordinance No. 1275
violated the plaintiffs' rights to due process of law, because the plaintiffs had no notice
that the trial court would or did decide the issue, and no full and fair opportunity to be
heard prior to the making of the purported decision. See e ^ Christiansen v. Harris, 163
P.2d 314 (Utah 1945)(discussing general contours of due process, especially under the
state constitution).
The trial court also violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52, which requires trial
courts to enter written decisions in resolving motions for summary judgment.5
Subsection (a) of that rule provides in relevant part, "The court shall, however, issue a
brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground."
While the trial court's order granting summary judgment indicates that dismissal
of the claims relating to Ordinance No. 1275 is based on the prior order of the court, the
court entered no prior order dismissing the claims.6
The trial court's failure to clearly articulate the basis for dismissing the claims,
while a violation of rule 52, does not require reversal on this basis because this Court can
assess the illegality of the dismissal of the claims on appeal without further discussion by
the trial court. Review of issues 1, 2 and 3 demonstrates that there was no proper basis
for dismissal of the claims. However, it is noteworthy that the trial court's failure to ever
clearly explain a basis for dismissal of the claims strips the trial court's ruling of the
presumption of correctness normally afforded to rulings of the trial courts.8
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POINT HI
IF THE APPEALS COURT DETERMINES THAT, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, THE COMMISSION MADE THE DECISION TO VACATE
NORTH UNION AVENUE AT THE MAY 25, 1994 HEARING, AND
THAT THE DECISION WAS "RENDERED" IMMEDIATELY
THEREAFTER WHEN DEFENDANTS BLOCKED OFF THAT ROAD
AND ALLOWED HERMES TO TEAR UP AND/OR ALTER THAT
ROAD, THEN PLAINTIFFS FILED THEIR PETITION FOR REVIEW
OF THAT DECISION IN A TIMELY MANNER.
The trial court apparently adopted the argument of the defendants that plaintiffs'
claims regarding Ordinance No. 1275 were subject to dismissal with prejudice because
the plaintiffs did not file a new complaint appealing from Ordinaace No. 1275 within 30
days of the enactment of this ordinance. The trial court apparently adopted the
defendants9 arguments that the decision to vacate the road was not "rendered" and
appealable until Ordinance No. 1275 was enacted.
Utah Code Ann. §17-27-810 governs the actions of the defendants at issue here,
the vacation of roads. It provides,
(1) (a) Within 30 days after the public hearing required by this
part, the responsible body or officer shall consider the petition.
(b) If the responsible body or officer is satisfied that neither
the public nor any person will be materially injured by the proposed
vacation, alteration, or amendment, and that there is good cause for the
vacation, alteration, or amendment, the legislative body, by ordinance, may
vacate, alter, or amend the plat, any portion of the plat, or any street or lot.
(c) The responsible body or officer may approve the vacation,
alteration, or amendment by ordinance, amended plat, administrative order,
or deed containing a stamp or mark indicating approval by the responsible
body or officer.
(d) The responsible body or officer shall ensure that the
vacation, alteration, or amendment is recorded in the office of the county
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recorder in which the land is located.
(2) An aggrieved party may appeal the responsible body's or officer's
decision to district court as provided in Section 17-27-1001.
It is critical to note that the statute governing vacation of roads allows for the
appeal of the decision on the petition for vacation, rather than of the adoption of the
ordinances. Utah Code Ann. §17-27-810(2), supra.
The statute governing land use appeals, Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001(1994),
similarly provides for appeals of decisions rendered, rather than ordinances enacted. It
states,
(1) No person may challenge in district court a county's land use
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under
authority of this chapter until they have exhausted their administrative
remedies.
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the
exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of
the decision with the district court within 30 days after the local decision is
rendered.
(3) The courts shall:
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal.
The trial court apparently accepted the defendants' argument that the decision to
vacate the road was not "rendered" until the successive Ordinance No. 1275 was formally
enacted.
In so interpreting the governing statutes, the trial court contravened fundamental
rules of statutory construction requiring courts to follow the plain meaning of legislation,
and to give normal meaning to each word enacted by the legislature.9 These rules of
statutory construction are essential to the constitutional doctrine of separation of
government powers,10 because they insure that courts apply the laws enacted by the
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legislatures, rather than legislatingfromthe bench.11
The decision rendered in the instant matter and subject to the appeal filed in the
trial court was the decision to vacate the road, which was made and actually carried out,
long before Ordinance No. 1275 was enacted.
The governing statutes allow for the appeals of decisions, and do not require that
the commissioners' decisions be enacted into formal ordinances to be appealable. While
the statute governing the vacation of roads specifically discusses the enactment of
ordinances in the road vacation process, in discussing appeals, the statute speaks in terms
of appeals of decisions, not of ordinances. Utah Code Ann. §17-27-810. The statute
governing such appeals, Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001, similarly speaks in terms of
appeals from decisions rendered, not decisions enacted into ordinances. Common usage
of the term "rendered" does not encompass the notion of enactment into formal
legislation.12

Had the legislature intended for appeals from the activities of the

commissioners to be limited to decisions formalized in ordinances, the legislature could
and would have specified that appeals lie from ordinances, rather than decisions. See
Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County, 913 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1995).9
In apparently concluding that the decision to vacate the road was not "rendered"
when it was voted upon at the May 25, 1994 hearing nor was it "rendered" when the road
was altered and/or destroyed, but was as a matter of law "rendered" when the most recent
ordinance was enacted, the trial court diverged from the plain meaning of the plain
language of the statutes governing the appeal.
By allowing the defendants to evade appeal of the road vacation decision via the
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enactment of a successive ordinance, the trial court effectively denied the plaintiffs their
rights to appeal and to access to the courts.13 As this case demonstrates, condoning the
defendants' argument and trial court's ruling would allow defendants to continually
evade appeal by simply enacting successive amended ordinances, even if such ordinances
were substantively identical to decisions already appealed from. Such gamesmanship
would portend litigation that would end only at the exhaustion of the resources of
plaintiffs, and would be fundamentally inconsistent with the plaintiffs' rights to due
process of law and access to the courts.
Obviously, the decision to vacate North Union Avenue was effectively rendered at
the time the actions seemingly allowed by the road vacation (the alteration, replacement
and destruction of North Union Avenue) commenced or were put into effect. This
process was initiated in early June, shortly after the public hearing, and continued without
regard for the adoption, signing and publication of the two road vacation ordinances.
Plaintiffs filed their complaint within 30 days of the "rendering" of this decision, at the
May 25th hearing or when destruction of the road began, and in so doing, fulfilled the
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001.

POINT IV
IF THE APPEALS COURT DETERMINES THAT AS A MATTER OF
LAW, THE DECISION TO VACATE NORTH UNION AVENUE WAS
NOT "RENDERED" UNTIL THE SIGNING OF A VACATION
ORDINANCE, THEN THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING WITH
PREJUDICE CLAIMS REGARDING THE VACATION ORDINANCE.
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If the trial court concluded that the decision to vacate North Union Avenue was not
legally enacted until the defendants had adopted and published Ordinance No. 1275, then
the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' claims as to the validity of the road
ordinance. Upon making that determination, the trial court should have concluded that
the County Commission did not properly vacate the road and that both of the vacation
ordinances were invalid and illegal.
A. ORDINANCES NO. 1270 AND NO. 1275 ARE BOTH
INVALID BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF THE COUNTY TO
STRICTLY FOLLOW THE ENABLING LEGISLATION.
As is required in the adoption of all ordinances, when adopting an ordinance to
vacate a public, platted road (particularly one which is still in use), strict adherence to the
enabling legislation is required. For instance, in the redevelopment case associated with
the instant case, Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County, 913 P.2d 723
(Utah 1995), the Supreme Court again affirmed the principal of strict adherence.
Because area redevelopment is serious action that may be in
derogation of individual property rights, strict compliance with enabling
legislation is required to enact ordinance setting up redevelopment plan.
Id. at 723 (citation omitted)
Certainly, the vacation of the public right-of-way which is and has always been the
sole access to plaintiffs' property is an action that may be in derogation of plaintiffs'
individual property rights and is as as serious an action as area redevelopment.
Consequently, the government agency taking that action is required to strictly comply
with the enabling legislation.
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Utah Code Ann. §17-27-810 governs the actions of the defendants at issue here,
the vacation of roads. It provides,
(1) (a) Within 30 days after the public hearing required by this
part, the responsible body or officer shall consider the petition.
(b) If the responsible body or officer is satisfied that neither
the public nor any person will be materially injured by the proposed
vacation, alteration, or amendment, and that there is good cause for the
vacation, alteration, or amendment, the legislative body, by ordinance, may
vacate, alter, or amend the plat, any portion of the plat, or any street or lot.
(c) The responsible body or officer may approve the vacation,
alteration, or amendment by ordinance, amended plat, administrative order,
or deed containing a stamp or mark indicating approval by the responsible
body or officer.
(d) The responsible body or officer shall ensure that the
vacation, alteration, or amendment is recorded in the office of the county
recorder in which the land is located.
(2) An aggrieved party may appeal the responsible body's or officer's
decision to district court as provided in Section 17-27-1001.
The "public hearing required by this part" was, presumably, the hearing held on
May 25, 1994, as that was the only hearing for which plaintiffs received notice. Both
vacation Ordinances No. 1270 (adopted on July 13, 1994) and No. 1275 (adopted on
August 10, 1994) were adopted more than 30 days after the public hearing. This was in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-810(l)(a), which requires that the vacation be
approved within 30 days after the public hearing. It is defendants, not plaintiffs, who
have failed to timely meet their 30-day statute-of-limitations. The result of having failed
to strictly comply with the enabling legislation is that the vacation ordinances, both 1270
and 1275, are invalid ab initio. Again, in Johnson, the Supreme Court concluded that,
because the RDA failed to comply with one of the provisions of The Utah Neighborhood
Development Act (1993), the "ordinance in question is invalid." Id. at 731.
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B.
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED NO NOTICE OF THE
ADOPTION AND SIGNING OF THE VACATION ORDINANCE,
AND BECAUSE DEFENDANTS ILLEGALLY BLOCKED OFF AND
ALLOWED HERMES TO TEAR OUT AND/OR ALTER NORTH
UNION AVENUE PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF EITHER
ORDINANCE, THE PURPORTED VACATION OF THE ROAD IS
A NULLITY.
It is an undisputed fact that the County closed North Union Avenue and that
defendants allowed Hermes to begin the process of tearing out that road, at least two
months before the adoption of Ordinance No. 1275. Defendants' argument that the
decision to vacate the road was not properly rendered until the adoption of that ordinance
is a candid admission on their part that the Commissioners intentionally allowed the
destruction of the public right-of-way long before they had vacated the road.
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently ruled on a case involving the vacation of
a public road, and the facts of that case are strikingly similar to the instant case. In Nelson
v. Provo City, 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994), this Court invalidated the road vacation
because of untimely and insufficient notice.
Roadway was not properly vacated, where city failed to notify
abutting landowners, or to notify its citizens generally pursuant to statute
until after purported vacation.
Id. at 35, citation omitted.
In the instant case, plaintiffs were notified of a public hearing on this issue, but
were never notified of any of the subsequent actions taken regarding the vacation of their
road. The Ordinances which were ultimately adopted to enact the road vacation differed
in substance and effect from what was discussed at the public hearing. Defendants (in an
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untimely fashion) adopted two different road vacation ordinances, but provided no notice
whatsoever of the underlying hearings or of the decisions made during those hearing
regarding the vacation of the road. Additionally, the adoption of these ordinances
occurred after the fact, when much of North Union Avenue was nothing but a memory.
"Thus, City's notice was not only insufficient, it was untimely. As a result, any purported
vacation of the Roadway is a nullity." Nelson at 38. This Court's decision in the Nelson
case, "to reverse the court's conclusion that City properly vacated the Roadway and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion," is also appropriate in this
action. [Again, because the trial court did not articulate the basis for granting defendants'
summary judgment motion, and because this represents an issue of law, not fact, the
Court of Appeals is not restrictedfromrendering an opinion on the process leading to the
adoption of the vacation ordinances. See footnote 8, below.]
C.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AFTER RECEIVING DEFENDANTS'
ADMISSIONS THAT THEY ILLEGALLY VACATED NORTH
UNION AVENUE.
IN SO DOING, THE TRIAL COURT
IMPROPERLY TRANSFERRED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PROCEDURE AND NOTICE FROM THE "RESPONSIBLE BODY"
TO THE PLAINTIFFS.
Again, Utah Code Ann. §17-27-808, et. seq. governs the actions of the defendants
in the vacation of roads. Section -810 provides,
(1) (a) Within 30 days after the public hearing required by this
part, the responsible body or officer shall consider the petition.
(b) If the responsible body or officer is satisfied that neither
the public nor any person will be materially injured by the proposed
vacation, alteration, or amendment, and that there is good cause for the
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vacation, alteration, or amendment, the legislative body, by ordinance, may
vacate, alter, or amend the plat, any portion of the plat, or any street or lot.
(c) The responsible body or officer may approve the vacation,
alteration, or amendment by ordinance, amended plat, administrative order,
or deed containing a stamp or mark indicating approval by the responsible
body or officer.
(d) The responsible body or officer shall ensure that the
vacation, alteration, or amendment is recorded in the office of the county
recorder in which the land is located.
(2) An aggrieved party may appeal the responsible body's or officer's
decision to district court as provided in Section 17-27-1001.
The County Commission is the "responsible body" referenced in this statute.
They, the defendants in this action, are responsible for following the procedure outlined
in the enabling ordinance, making the vacation decision, holding public hearings,
providing adequate and timely notice, adopting and recording the vacation ordinance, and
so forth. It is clear from the plain language of the legislation that the burden of
responsibility for the actions taken to vacate a public road rests squarely on the shoulders
of the County Commission.
However, when the Commission admitted to the trial court that the decision to
vacate North Union Avenue was not made until the adoption of Ordinance No. 1275,
although they had effected that road vacation months prior to the adoption of that
ordinance, the Court inexplicably dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. In so doing, the trial
court effectively, and incorrectly, transferred the responsibility for procedure to the
plaintiffs awayfromthe Commission.
Plaintiffs filed their complaint on the road vacation decision when defendants told
plaintiffs that the decision had been made. When defendants held additional hearings on
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the issue, and when they adopted the road vacation ordinances, defendants did not
provide any notice to plaintiffs of those decisions. Nevertheless, defendants and then the
trial court expected plaintiffs to be responsible for actions and decisions of which they
had no knowledge, and for which the enabling legislation clearly anticipated the County
Commission should be responsible. The trial court erred in shifting this burden of
responsibility by dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' claims regarding the road vacation
ordinance.
CONCLUSION
Defendants waived the right to challenge the timeliness of plaintiffs' complaints
by failing to plead timeliness as an affirmative defense. This Court, then, must make the
determination of when the road vacation was properly enacted and rendered.
If this Court determines that the decision on the road vacation was properly made
at the May 25, 1994 hearing, then plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to reverse the
trial court's dismissal, with prejudice, of all claims relating to Ordinance No. 1275, and
to remand the case for further proceedings consistent with plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
or Second Amended Complaint.
If this Court makes the determination that the decision to vacate North Union
Avenue was not rendered until the adoption and publication of the vacation ordinance,
whether it's No. 1270 or No. 1275, then plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to
reverse the trial court's dismissal, with prejudice, of all claims relating to Ordinance No.
1275, and to remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of December, 1996.

a

t)iane Pearl Meibos
Attorney pro se

vOco^tp-t T^-A
Walter F. Bugden, Jr.
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MOR;
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Culbq
and Eva and Blaine Johnson
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FOOTNOTES

This lack of notice, in and of itself, invalidates the road vacation ordinance, as per
the ruling of this Court in Nelson v. Provo City, 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994), in which
this Court invalidated the road vacation because of untimely and insufficient notice,
Roadway was not properly vacated, where City failed to notify
abutting landowners, or to notify its citizens generally pursuant to statute
until after purported vacation.
Id. at 35, citation omitted.

See footnote 1, above.

a

Rule No. 8 states in full,
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a
demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the
alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his
defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the
adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials
shall fairly meet the substance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good
faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it
as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in
good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his
denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally
deny all the averments except such designated averments or paragraphs as he expressly
admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so by
general denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set
forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk,
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of
consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release,
res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly
designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms,
if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
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(d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not
denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive
pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical
forms of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately
or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When
two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently
would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or
more of the alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or
defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable
grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in
Rule 11.
(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.

^

Rule No. 12 provides in its entirety,
(a) When Presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty days after
the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly
provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a pleading stating a
cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after the service
upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his reply to a counterclaim in the answer within
twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty
days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion
under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by
order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the
merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the courts
action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite statement.
(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4)
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion
making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is
permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other
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defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any
defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense
numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the
pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule
56.
(d) Preliminary Hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for
judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined before
trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearings and
determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for More Definite Statement. If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required
to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite statement before
interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained
of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed
within ten days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it
deems just.
(f) Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by
a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon him, the court may order
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of Defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may
join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available to him. If a party
makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections
then available to him which this rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall not
thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as
provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of Defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which he does
not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief
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can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of
failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and
except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b)
in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading After Denial of a Motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the
denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such
motion.
(j) Security for Costs of a Nonresident Plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action
resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to
require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may be awarded
against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable
necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with
sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded
against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or
agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of Failure to File Undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon
motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.

D

Rule 52 states in full,
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are
not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as
the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law
are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear
in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in
Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry
of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend
the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial
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pursuant to Rule 59. Whenfindingsof fact are made in actions tried by the court without
a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the Trial
Court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Except in actions for
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue
of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.

In assessing the adequacy of the trial court's order granting summary judgment,
this Court is not limited to the written order of the court, but may review all findings
expressed in court documents and in transcripts of bench rulings. See e ^ Merriam v.
Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah App. 1990)(in child custody decision, Court
indicated, "[0]n review we are not limited to writtenfindings,and may properly examine
findings expressed solelyfromthe bench or contained in other court documents, such as
court memoranda.").
1

See Masters v. Worslev, 777 P.2d 499, 500-501 (Utah App. 1989)(noting that trial
court's failure to comply with Rule 52 is normally reversible error, but declining to
remand where the interests of judicial economy called on the Court to simply reverse the
trial court on the merits of the trial court's order granting summary judgment).

For instance, in Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc..
844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992), the court criticized the trial court's ruling, stating,
Such a blanket statement provides us with no guidance as to the trial couifs
reasoning. It therefore does not comply with rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, which requires trial judges to issue brief written
statements of their grounds for granting summary judgment when multiple
grounds are presented. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). Although failure to issue
a statement of grounds is not reversible error absent unusual circumstances,
we take this opportunity to remind trial judges that the presumption of
correctness ordinarily afforded trial court rulings "has little operative effect
when members of this court cannot divine the trial court's reasoning
because of the cryptic nature of its ruling."
Id. at 979 n.4 (citation omitted).
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For instance, in Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County,
913 P.2d 723 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court explained,
The primary rule guiding us in statutory interpretation is that we
give effect to the intent of the legislature. To discover that intent, we look
first to the plain language of the statute. "Unambiguous language in [a]
statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning." In
construing a statute, we assume that "each term in the statute was used
advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading
is unreasonably confused or inoperable." "Only when we find ambiguity in
the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative
history and relevant policy considerations."
...[W]e assume "each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the
statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably
confused or inoperable."
Id. at 727-729 (citations omitted).
Unlike the federal constitution's implied separation of powers doctrine, the Utah
Constitution contains an express requirement for separation of government powers. In
article V section 1, it states,
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided
into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.

As is explained in section 46.03 of Sutherland, Statutory Construction.
The preference for literalism in determining the effect of statute is
based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The courts
owe fidelity to the will of the legislature. What a legislature says in the text
of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will.
Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the
legislature. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has captured this idea in the
following language: "It is an elementary proposition that courts only
determine by construction the scope and intent of the law when the law
itself is ambiguous or doubtful. If a law is plain and within the legislative
power, it declares itself and nothing is left for interpretation. It is as binding
upon the court as upon every citizen. To allow a court, in such a case, to
say that the law must mean something different from the common import of
its language, because the court may think that its penalties are unwise or
harsh would make the judicial superior to the legislative branch of the
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government, and practically invest it with the lawmaking power. The
remedy for a harsh law is not in interpretation but in amendment or repeal.
Id. (citation omitted).

For instance, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the term render as follows:
1: to extract (as lard) by heating 2: DELIVER, GIVE; also: YIELD 3: to
give in return 4: to do (a service) for another <~aid> 5: to cause to be or
become: MAKE 6: to reproduce or represent by artistic or verbal means 7:
TRANSLATE <~ into English>
LD

In addition to the statutes providing the plaintiffs' rights to appeal, Utah Code
Ann. sections 17-27-810 and 1001, Article I section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides,
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and
no person shall be barredfromprosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Article I section 7 to the Utah Constitution complements the open courts provision,
guaranteeing due process of law. See generally Berry by and through Berry v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675-76 (Utah 1985)(interpreting Article I sections 7 and 11
as requiring fair and equal access to the courts for protection of fundamental rights and
for remedies for injuries to people, property and reputations).
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A

17-27-808

COUNTIES

210 (1952) (interpreting former § 57-5-4 with
§ 17-5-233 and former § 27-3-3).
A statutory dedication by the filing of plats of
a subdivision vests a fee title in the municipality or county to the streets shown therein.
Oregon Short Line R.R. v. Murray City, 2 Utah
2d 427 277 P2d 798 (1954)
Location of streets.
—Present use.
The court rejected as unsound the argument
that streets could not be located on the plat of a
township unless the street was already in use.
Hall v. North Ogden City, 109 Utah 304, 166
P.2d 221, judgment set aside on other grounds
on rehearing, Hall v. North Ogden City, 109
Utah 325, 175 P.2d 703 (1946).

Rights of owners of abutting land.
'
- B o u n d a r y by acquiescence.
W * 1 ^ ^^y
owned street separating prop,
ert
y o w n e l d b ? t w o parties, the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence could not apply since
e
rcQU11"61*161^that the parties be adjoining"
landowners was not met. Condas v. Willesen
674 R2d 115 (Utah 1983).
—Damages.
The owner of abutting land is not entitled to
damages for the laying of a city water main in a
street in a platted subdivision where the permission of the commissioners of the county in
which the street is situated has been obtained,
White v. Salt Lake City, 121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d
210 (1952).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Dedication § 22.
Key Numbers. — Dedication «=» 19(1).

17-27-808. Vacating or changing a subdivision plat.
(1) (a) The county legislative body or any other officer that the legislative
body designates by ordinance may, with or without a petition, consider any
proposed vacation, alteration, or amendment of a subdivision plat, any
portion of a subdivision plat, or any street, lot, or alley contained in a
subdivision plat at a public hearing.
(b) If a petition is filed, the responsible body or officer shall hold the
public hearing within 45 days after it is filed if:
(i) the plat change includes the vacation of a public street or alley;
(ii) any owner within the plat notifies the municipality of their
objection in writing within ten days of mailed notification; or
(iii) a public hearing is required because all of the owners in the
subdivision have not signed the revised plat.
(2) Any fee owner, as shown on the last county assessment rolls, of land
within the subdivision that has been laid out and platted as provided in this
part may, in writing, petition the legislative body to have the plat, any portion
of it, or any street or lot contained in it, vacated, altered, or amended as
provided in this section.
(3) A petition to vacate, alter, or amend an entire plat, a portion of a plat, or
a street or lot contained in a plat shall include:
(a) the name and address of all owners of record of the land contained
in the entire plat;
(b) the name and address of all owners of record of land adjacent to any
street that is proposed to be vacated, altered, or amended; and
(c) the signature of each of these owners who consents to the petition.
(4) (a) Petitions that lack the consent of all owners referred to in Subsection
(3) may not be scheduled for consideration at a public hearing before the
responsible body or officer until the notice required by this part is given.
(b) The petitioner shall pay the cost of the notice.
(5) When the responsible body or officer proposes to vacate, alter, or amend
a subdivision plat, or any street or lot contained in a subdivision plat, they
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shall consider the issue at a public hearing after giving the notice required by
this part.
(6) Petitions to adjust lot lines between adjacent properties may be executed
upon the recordation of an appropriate deed if:
(a) no new dwelling lot or housing unit results from the lot line
adjustment;
(b) the adjoining property owners consent to the lot line adjustment;
(c) the lot line adjustment does not result in remnant land that did not
previously exist; and
(d) the adjustment does not result in violation of applicable zoning
requirements.
History: C. 1953,17-27-808, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 101; 1995, ch. 179, § 18.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, inserted aor any
other officer that the legislative body designates by ordinance" in Subsection (l)(a); substituted "responsible body or officer" for "county

legislative body in Subsection (l)(b) and for
"legislative body" in Subsections (4)(a) and (5);
added Subsections (l)(b)(i) to (l)(b)(iii) and (6);
and made a stylistic change,
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235,
§ 1 1 0 m a k e 8 the act effective on July 1, 1992.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Failure of Subdivision Control in the Western United States: A

Blueprint for Local Government Action, 1988
Utah L. Rev. 569.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Statutory history.
The origin of former section in the Laws of
1894 and its later status are given in Hall v.

North Ogden City, 109 Utah 304,166 R2d 221.
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Dedication § 60.

17-27-809. Notice of hearing for plat change.
(1) (a) The responsible body or officer shall give notice of the proposed plat
change by mailing the notice to all owners referred to in Section 10-9-808,
addressed to their mailing addresses appearing on the rolls of the county
assessor of the county in which the land is located.
(b) The responsible body or officer shall ensure that the notice includes:
(i) a statement that anyone objecting to the proposed plat change
must file a written objection to the change within ten days of the date
of the notice;
(ii) a statement that if no written objections are received by the
legislative body within the time limit, no public hearing will be held;
and
(iii) the date, place, and time when a hearing will be held, if one is
required, to consider a vacation, alteration, or amendment without a
petition when written objections are received or to consider any
petition that does not include the consent of all land owners as
required by Section 17-27-808.
(2) If the proposed change involves the vacation, alteration, or amendment
of a street, the responsible body or officer shall give notice of the date, place,
and time of the hearing by:
(a) mailing notice as required in Subsection (1); and
(b) either:
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17-27-810

COUNTIES

(i) publishing the notice once a week for four consecutive weeks
before the hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the county
in which the land subject to the petition is located; or
(ii) if there is no newspaper of general circulation in the county,
post the notice for four consecutive weeks before the hearing in three
public places in that county.
History: C. 1953,17-27-809, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 102; 1995, ch. 179, § 19.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, rewrote Subsection (1), adding the provisions specifying the
contents of the notice and, in Subsection (2) and

the beginning of Subsection (1), substituted
"responsible body or officer'' for "legislative
body."
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235
§ n o makes the act effective on July 1, 1992*

17-27-810. Grounds for vacating or changing a plat.
(1) (a) Within 30 days after the public hearing required by this part, the
responsible body or officer shall consider the petition.
(b) If the responsible body or officer is satisfied that neither the public
nor any person will be materially injured b}/ the proposed vacation,
alteration, or amendment, and that there is good cause for the vacation,
alteration, or amendment, the legislative body, by ordinance, may vacate,
alter, or amend the plat, any portion of the plat, or any street or lot.
(c) The responsible body or officer may approve the vacation, alteration,
or amendment by ordinance, amended plat, administrative order, or deed
containing a stamp or mark indicating approval by the responsible body or
officer.
(d) The responsible body or officer shall ensure that the vacation,
alteration, or amendment is recorded in the office of the county recorder in
which the land is located.
(2) An aggrieved party may appeal the responsible body's or officer's
decision to district court as provided in Section 17-27-1001.
History: C. 1953,17-27-810, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 103; 1995, ch. 179, § 20.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "responsible body or officer" for "legislative body"

in four places, added Subsection (l)(c), and
redesignated former Subsection (l)(c) as Subsection (l)(d).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235,
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Civil liability.
The purpose of former §§ 57-5-5 and 1727-21 was to impose a duty running to the

sovereign, and a violation thereof did not necessarily give rise to civil liability. Ellis v. Hale,
13 Utah 2d 279, 373 R2d 382 (1962).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Dedication § 23.

17-27-811.

Penalties.

(1) (a) Any county recorder who files or records a plat of a subdivision
without the approvals required by this part is guilty of a misdemeanor.
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EXHIBIT B

17-27-1001

COUNTIES

PART 10
APPEALS AND ENFORCEMENT
17-27-1001. Appeals.
(1) No person may challenge in district court a county's land use decisions
made under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of this
chapter until they have exhausted their administrative remedies.
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of the
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the
district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered.
(3) The courts shall:
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decisio'n is arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal.
History: C. 1953, 17-27-1001, enacted by
L. 1991, ch. 235, § 106.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235,
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Violation of zoning resolution.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Plaintiff seeking to enjoin construction of a
trailer park was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before an action for injunctive relief could be maintained. Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 15 Utah 2d 305,392 P.2d 40
(1964).
A party must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the denial of a building permit. Hatch v. Utah County
Planning Dep't, 685 P.2d 550 (Utah 1984).
Plaintiff aggrieved by a decision of the county
commission applying the zoning ordinance was
required to appeal that decision to the board of

17-27-1002.

adjustment; plaintiff could not initiate mandamus proceedings under § 17-27-1002 against
t h e commission for its alleged violation of the
ordinance. Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 267
U t a h Adv
' **>• 2 6 ( U t a h C t A*>P' 1 9 9 5 ) '
Violation of zoning resolution.
Landowners under former § 17-27-23 had a
separate cause of action in the courts when a
violation of a zoning resolution was charged;
but where the alleged violation of the ordinance
arose from the administration of the zoning
ordinance by an administrative agency, appeal
from the administrative ruling should have
been taken to the proper administrative tribunal, or a suit should have been commenced in
the courts within ninety days. Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 15 Utah 2d 305,392 P.2d 40
(1964) (decided under former § 17-27-15).

Enforcement.

(1) (a) A county, county attorney, or any owner of real estate within the
county in which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the
authority of this chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to
other remedies provided by law, institute:
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate
actions; or
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful
building, use, or act.
(b) A county need only establish the violation to obtain the injunction.
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EXHIBIT C

Rule 8

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

tion. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 196;
299 P.2d 827 (1956).
Cited in Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123
COLLATERAL
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions,
Rules, and Orders § 1 et seq.; 61A Am. Jur. 2d
Pleading §§ 1 et seq., 238.
* ra
cr\ n T o \K ±jr\j si
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 1
et s ^ 71 C.J.S. Pleading § § 63 to 210,140 et
seq., 211 et seq.
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment

22

Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953); Thomas v.
Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507
(1956)REFERENCES
as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8
A.L.R.3d 1361.
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action
as affected by opponent's motion for summary
, - „ j m ^ i . ;„AJ~L^ ,*„ +i^ J ^ ; ; ^ „,. A(
^SST^TASJSS
fif*
°
K e y N u m b e r s # __ Motions •=• 1 et seq.;
Pleading *=» 38 V2 to 186, 187 et seq.

Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original claim, counterclaim, crossfclaim or third-party claim,
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of .the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the
obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant,
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as
denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No
technical forms of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal
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or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially the same as Rule 8, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Amended and supplemental pleadings, U.R.C.P. 15.
Arbitration, § 78-31a-l et seq.
Comparative negligence, § 78-27-38.
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13.
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1
et seq.
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12.
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim,
§§ 21-1-5, 78-6-14.
Fellow servant defined, § 34-25-2.
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10.
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and
brevity of statement, U.R.C.P. 84.
Forms of answers, Forms 21, 22.
Hearing of certain defenses before trial,
U.R.C.P. 12(d).
Interpleader, U.R.C.P. 22.

Motions, forms for, Forms 20, 23, 24.
Numbered paragraphs, U.R.C.P. 10(b).
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2.
Reply to answer, order for, U.R.C.P. 7(a).
Security interest, enforceability of, § 70A9-203.
Special forms of pleadings and writs abolished, U.R.C.P. 65B(a).
Statute of frauds, generally, § 25-5-1 et seq.
Statute of frauds, investment securities,
§ 70A-8-319.
Statute of frauds, sales, § 70A-2-201.
Statute of frauds, Uniform Commercial
Code, personal property not otherwise covered,
§ 70A-1-206.
Third-party practice, U.R.C.P. 14.
Time for answer, U.R.C.P. 12(a).
Uniform Commercial Code, supplementary
principles of law applicable, § 70A-1-103.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affirmative defenses.
—Accord and satisfaction.
Pleading.
Time limitation.
—Avoidance.
—Consent.
—Election of remedies.
—Estoppel.
Failure to plead.
—Failure of consideration.
Failure to plead.
Pleading.
—Failure to plead.
Affidavit opposing summary judgment.
Denial.
Notice and opportunity.
Waiver of defense^
—Fraud.
Necessary allegations.
—Limitation of Landowner Liability Act.
—Mitigation of damages.
Failure to plead;
Pleading.
—Mutual mistake.
—Statute of frauds.
Motion to dismiss.
Pleading.
—Statute of limitations.
Applicability to plaintiffs.
Pleading.
Waiver.
—Waiver.
Claims for relief.
—Amendment of pleading.
—Attorney fees.
—Essential allegations.
Alienation of affections.
—Request for alternative relief.
—Sufficiency of complaint.
Attachment of exhibit.
Found not sufficient.

Found sufficient.
Liberal construction.
Consistency.
—Double recovery.
—Election between claims.
—Election of remedies under contract.
—Res judicata.
—Separate claims.
Contract and quantum meruit.
Defenses.
—Lack of consideration.
Effect of failure to deny.
Purpose of rules.
Cited.
Affirmative defenses.
.—Accord and satisfaction.
Pleading.
Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded in the answer in
order to be raised; in action to recover wages
and commissions allegedly due to plaintiff,
where defendant did not raise the defense in
his answer, he could not subsequently rely on
it. Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 437 P.2d
202 (1968).
Assertion of accord and satisfaction is generally raised by way of affirmative defense to an
action on the original agreement, and when so
raised, it must be properly pleaded. Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369
(Utah 1980).
Time limitation.
In action to rescind loan secured by mortgage, where defendant mortgagee failed to answer amended complaint within ten days after
service thereof under Rule 15, but filed motion
for permission to set forth accord and satisfaction one week before trial, refusal was not
abuse of court's discretion. Wasescha v. Terra,
Inc., 528 P.2d 802 (Utah 1974).
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Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions for securities fraud, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 107.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions for infliction of emotional distress, 98
A.L.R. Fed. 442.

Rule 12

Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in antitrust actions, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 573.
Procedural requirements for imposition of
sanctionsunder Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil
Pr0cedure, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 556.
Numbers. — Pleading «=» 287 to 304.
K
J

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed
by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten
days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of
the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensablQ party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which.the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
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(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such
order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule arid does not include therein
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be
deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff.
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 12, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Motions generally,
U.R.C.P. 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Jurisdiction over the person.
Motion for judgment on pleadings.
—Matters outside of pleadings.
Answers to interrogatories.
Rights of opposing party.
Motion for more definite statement.

—Bill of particulars.
—Criteria.
—Motion to dismiss distinguished.
—Purpose.
Delay.
Obtaining evidence.
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
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action, to prove permanence of injuries and to
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
AL.R.3d 170.
'propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
AT R3d 1081
ti' J--X _•
• 4_ x• -i
Verdict-urgmg instructions m civil case
B e
stressing desirability and importance of agreement, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281.
Verdict-urging instructions m civil case
commenting on weight of majority view or authorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case admonishing jurors to refrain from intransigence

R u l e 52

or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of jurors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154.
Construction of statutes or rules making
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform apP™ ved J^T instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128.
A Necessity and propnety of instructing on alternative theories of negligence or breach of
warranty, where instruction on strict liability
. . _ , . • .
J _* r u-r*
co
rnven 121 products liability case, 52
m
tort
A L R 3d 101
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construction and effect ofprovision in Rule 51, and simHaj. state rules, that counsel be given opportunity to make objections to instructions out of
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310.
Key Numbers. — Trial «=» 182 to 296.

Rule 52. Findings by the court,
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing. to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
A

Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract.

—Child custody.
—Credibility of witnesses.
—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement.
—Evidentiary disputes.
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913 P.2d 723, Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County, (Utah 1995)
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*723 913P.2d723
Eva C. JOHNSON, C. Eugene Croxford, Burton J.
Arrington,
Cammon I. Arrington, Jeffrey B. Arrington, Irby
N.
Arrington, B-J Dry Cleaning and Shirt
Laundering, 4-A
Alliance, Arthur Milne, Thomas Lloyd, Union Park
Center
Associates, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
The REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY, Jerold H.
Barnes, the Salt Lake County Commission, and the
Salt Lake County Commissioners,
individually, Defendants and Appellees,
Hermes & Associates, Intervenor.
No. 940165.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 2, 1995.
Rehearing Denied March 26, 1996.
Residential property owner brought action against
county
redevelopment
agency
and
county
commission, challenging legality and regularity of
county ordinance adopting redevelopment plan.
Owner and agency moved for summary judgment.
The District Court, Salt Lake County, Michael R.
Murphy, J., granted agency's motions and denied
owner's motion, ruling that agency had sufficiently
complied with procedures set out in Utah
Neighborhood Development Act to make ordinance
valid.
Owner appealed.
The Supreme Court,
Zimmerman, C.J., held that: (1) amended provision
of Act, requiring that finding that redevelopment
project area is blighted area be made by agency at
time preliminary plan for project is prepared and by
legislative body prior to adopting plan, applied
retroactively to redevelopment project for which
preliminary plan was prepared before effective date of
statutory amendment; (2) agency did not comply with
Act provision and, thus, resulting ordinance adopting
redevelopment plan was invalid, despite contention
that agency complied with provision by having
generic belief that area was blighted when it decided
to prepare preliminary plan; and (3) commission's
preliminary vote, concluding that owner's property
was blighted, was not formal "finding of blight" so as
to trigger right under Act to de novo review of finding
of blight and, thus, owner was not entitled to de novo
review of preliminary vote.
Reversed and remanded.

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ®^267
268
268IX Public Improvements
268IX(A)
Power to Make Improvements or
Grant Aid Therefor
268k267
Nature and purposes of improvements
in general.
Utah 1995.
Purpose of Utah Neighborhood Development Act is
to cure problem of blight through economic
redevelopment. U.C.A.1953, 17A-2-1201 et seq.
2. APPEAL AND ERROR <@^842(1)
30
30XVI Review
30XVI(A)
Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838
Questions Considered
30k842
Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l)
In general.
Utah 1995.
On appeal, Supreme Court would grant no particular
deference to district court's statutory interpretations
but would review them for correctness.
3. APPEAL AND ERROR <S^841
30
—
30XVI Review
30XVI(A)
Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838
Questions Considered
30k841
Review where facts are not disputed.
Utah 1995.
When no facts are in dispute, challenge to summary
judgment presents only conclusions of law.
4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ®^267
268 —
268IX Public Improvements
268IX(A)
Power to Make Improvements or
Grant Aid Therefor
268k267
Nature and purposes of improvements
in general.
Utah 1995.
Proper construction of Utah Neighborhood
Development Act is question of law. U.C.A.1953,
17A-2-1201 et seq.
5. STATUTES®^ 181(1)
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36 Ik 180
Intention of Legislature
361kl81
In General
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913 P.2d 723, Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County, (Utah 1995)
361kl81(l)
In general.
Utah 1995.
Primary rule guiding Supreme Court in statutory
interpretation is that Court gives effect to intent of
legislature.
6. STATUTES <®^ 188
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36lkl87
Meaning of Language
361kl88
In general.
Utah 1995.
To discover intent of legislature, Supreme Court
looks first to plain language of statute.
7. STATUTES®^ 189
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36lkl87
Meaning of Language
361kl89
Literal and grammatical
interpretation.
[See headnote text below]
7. STATUTES <@^>212.6
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k212
Presumptions to Aid Construction
361k212.6
Words used.
Utah 1995.
In construing statute, Supreme Court assumes that
each term in statute was used advisedly; thus,
statutory words are read literally unless such reading
is unreasonably confused or inoperable.
8. STATUTES®^ 184
361 ---361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36 lkl 80
Intention of Legislature
361kl84
Policy and purpose of act.
[See headnote text below]
8. STATUTES <@^>217.4
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k213
Extrinsic Aids to Construction
361k217.4
Legislative history in general.
Utah 1995.
Only when Supreme Court finds ambiguity in
statute's plain language does Court need to seek
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guidance from legislative history and relevant policy
considerations.
9. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <©^>266
268 —
268IX Public Improvements
268IX(A)
Power to Make Improvements or
Grant Aid Therefor
268k266
Constitutional and statutory
provisions.
Utah 1995.
Amended provision of Utah Neighborhood
Development Act, requiring that finding that
redevelopment project area is blighted area be made
by agency at time preliminary plan for project is
prepared and by legislative body prior to adopting
plan, applied retroactively to redevelopment project
for which preliminary plan was prepared before
effective date of statutory amendment; fact that
nonretroactivity language was attached only to certain
of amended Act provisions and not to others was clear
indication that legislature intended to exempt ongoing
redevelopment projects only from those specific
sections containing nonretroactivity clauses, not from
provisions of amended Act as a whole. U.C.A. 1953,
17A-2-1208(l).
10. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <£=>299
268 —
268IX Public Improvements
268IX(B)
Preliminary Proceedings and
Ordinances or Resolutions
268k299
Determination as to necessity and
utility of improvement.
Utah 1995.
County redevelopment agency did not comply with
Utah Neighborhood Development Act provision
requiring that finding, that redevelopment project area
is blighted area, be made by agency at time
preliminary plan for project is prepared and, thus,
resulting ordinance adopting redevelopment plan was
invalid, despite contention that agency complied with
provision by having generic belief that area was
blighted when it decided to prepare preliminary plan;
generic belief was inconsistent with common meaning
of term "finding," such construction of term "finding"
was inconsistent with purpose and intent of legislature
in enacting Act, and such construction was
unworkable when applied to term "finding" in other
provisions in same Act section.
U.C.A. 1953,
17A-2-1208(l).
11. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ®^>282(1)
268 —
268IX Public Improvements
268IX(A)
Power to Make Improvements or
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Grant Aid Therefor
268k282
Basis or Plan of Improvements
268k282(l)
In general.
Utah 1995.
*723 Because area redevelopment is serious action
that may be in derogation of individual property
rights, strict compliance with enabling legislation is
required to enact ordinance setting up redevelopment
plan. U.C.A.1953, 17A-2-1208(1).
12. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <®^>267
268 —
268IX Public Improvements
268IX(A)
Power to Make Improvements or
Grant Aid Therefor
268k267
Nature and purposes of improvements
in general.
Utah 1995.
Utah Neighborhood Development Act is broad in
scope and must be interpreted to delegate to agencies
ample power to serve purposes of Act. U.C.A. 1953,
17A-2-1201 et seq.
13. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <S==>267
268 —
268IX Public Improvements
268IX(A)
Power to Make Improvements or
Grant Aid Therefor
268k267
Nature and purposes of improvements
in general.
Utah 1995.
Utah Neighborhood Development Act, which must
be interpreted to delegate to agencies ample power to
serve purposes of Act, must be strictly followed.
U.C.A.1953, 17A-2-1201 et seq.
14. STATUTES <®^>223.2(.5)
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k223
Construction with Reference to Other
Statutes
361k223.2
Statutes Relating to the Same
Subject Matter in General
361k223.2(.5) In general.
Utah 1995.
Supreme Court does not construe particular section
of state statutory code in the abstract but, rather, in
manner that is harmonious with other closely related
code provisions.
15. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <S=*299
268 —
268IX Public Improvements
268IX(B)
Preliminary Proceedings
Ordinances or Resolutions

and

268k299
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Determination as to necessity and
utility of improvement.

Utah 1995.
Utah Neighborhood Development Act provision
requiring that finding, that redevelopment project area
is blighted area, be made by agency at time
preliminary plan for project is prepared contemplates
formal, written finding that area is blighted before
preliminary plan is prepared for that area.
U.C.A.1953, 17A-2-1208(l).
16. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <@^321(2)
268 —
268IX Public Improvements
268IX(B)
Preliminary Proceedings and
Ordinances or Resolutions
268k321
Review of Proceedings
268k321(l)
Right to Review in General
268k321(2)
As to necessity or utility.
Utah 1995.
Preliminary vote of county commission, concluding
that owner's residential property was blighted, was
not formal "finding of blight" so as to trigger right
under Utah Neighborhood Development Act to de
novo review of finding of blight and, thus, owner was
not entitled to de novo review of preliminary vote.
U.C.A.1953, 17A-2-1208(3).
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.
17. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <®=*299
268 —
268IX Public Improvements
268IX(B)
Preliminary Proceedings and
Ordinances or Resolutions
268k299
Determination as to necessity and
utility of improvement.
[See headnote text below]
17. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <@^>321(2)
268 —
268IX Public Improvements
268IX(B)
Preliminary Proceedings and
Ordinances or Resolutions
268k321
Review of Proceedings
268k321(l)
Right to Review in General
268k321(2)
As to necessity or utility.
Utah 1995.
For purposes of Utah Neighborhood Development
Act provisions, requiring that finding that
redevelopment project area is blighted area be made
by agency at time preliminary plan for project is
prepared and by legislative body prior to adopting
plan, and governing property owner's right to de novo
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913 P.2d 723, Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County, (Utah 1995)
review of finding of blight by agency or governing
body, "finding of blight" means formal, written
finding that area is blighted.
U.C.A.1953,
17A-2-1208(l, 3).
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.
*724 Third District, Salt Lake County;
Honorable Michael R. Murphy.

The

*725 Nolan J. Olsen, Martin N. Olsen, Midvale,
and Walter F. Bugden, Salt Lake City, for Johnson,
Harold A. Hintze, Salt Lake City, for Barnes and the
Redevelopment Agency.
Paul G. Maughan, Douglas R. Short, Salt Lake
City, for the County Commission.
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preliminary plan, it is submitted to the legislative
body (i.e., city council or county commission) for
ultimate approval. Id. §§ 17A-2-1215, -1225, -1227.
"Upon adoption by the legislative body the agency
shall carry out the redevelopment project set forth in
the plan."
Id. § 17A-2-1215.
The RDA is
empowered to use increased tax revenues generated
by the redevelopment to fund the project.
Id. §
17A-2-1247. "[BJecause redevelopment is a serious
action that may be in derogation of individual
property rights," Salt Lake County v. Murray City
Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339, 1344 (Utah 1979),
the Utah Neighborhood Development Act contains
numerous safeguards to protect property owners.
For instance, eminent domain may not be used by the
RDA if the purpose of the plan is economic
development unless the area to be developed is first
found to be blighted.
Utah Code Ann. §§
17A-2-1208, -1209.

Nick J. Colessides, Salt Lake City, for Hermes.
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
Eva C. Johnson appeals from a grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, the
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County ("the
RDA") (FN1) and the Salt Lake County Commission
("the Commission").
Johnson and others brought
suit under the 1993 version of the Utah Neighborhood
Development Act, (FN2) challenging the legality and
regularity of a Salt Lake County ordinance adopting
the Union Fort Redevelopment Plan. After each side
moved for summary judgment, the district court
granted defendants' motions and denied Johnson's,
ruling that the RDA had sufficiently complied with the
procedures set out in the 1993 Act to make the
ordinance valid. (FN3) We reverse and remand to
the district court to enter judgment in favor of
Johnson in accordance with this opinion.
[1] By way of background, the purpose of Utah's
Neighborhood Development Act is to cure the
problem of "blight" through economic redevelopment
of the blighted area. Redevelopment Agency v.
Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1987)
("Acquisition and redevelopment of 'blighted'
property contributes to the health of the
community."). The first step in the redevelopment
process is the designation of a redevelopment survey
area.
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1204.
After
boundaries are set for the survey area, the properties
within the area are studied to determine if economic
redevelopment is feasible. Id. If redevelopment is
feasible, the RDA may formulate a preliminary plan
for the redevelopment of all or part of the survey
area. Id. § 17A-2-1206. Once the RDA approves a

With this background in mind, we move on to the
instant case. The dispositive facts are undisputed.
At the heart of this case are a 22.5-acre tract of land
and a 4.3-acre tract of land, both located in an
unincorporated portion of Salt Lake County. At the
beginning of the events in question, a portion of the
22.5-acre tract was owned by Hermes & Associates,
Ltd., an intervenor in this case. By the time this
appeal was argued, however, Hermes owned all of
the property in both parcels except for Johnson's.
*726 In 1991, Hermes operated a shopping center
known as the Family Center at Fort Union on
property adjacent to the two tracts of land in question.
As a shopping center developer, Hermes wanted to
expand its Family Center operations onto the
22.5-acre tract.
In furtherance of this desire, on
October 14, 1991, Hermes requested that the RDA
designate the 22.5-acre tract as a redevelopment
survey area. See id. § 17A-2-1207 (1991). The
RDA complied with Hermes' request and passed a
resolution designating the 22.5-acre parcel as the
"Union Family Center Redevelopment Survey Area."
This survey area was to be studied to determine if
redevelopment was feasible. The Commission then
met and facilitated the study by changing the county's
master plan to accommodate the use Hermes proposed
for the survey area.
In June of 1992, after deciding that even more land
was needed for the proposed expansion of its
shopping center, Hermes requested that an additional
4.3 acres be added to the survey area. The request
was granted by the RDA in September, and the
Commission again changed the master plan to
accommodate the proposed expansion.
Plaintiff
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Johnson's property, a residence, was included in the
additional 4.3 acres.
On November 18, 1991, while only the original
22.5-acre tract was proposed for redevelopment, the
RDA hired independent consultants to study the
survey area to determine whether "blight" existed and
to assess the proposed redevelopment's impact on the
area's traffic and economy.
The consultants
completed and published the blight survey in
November of 1992.
The final completed survey
concluded that the whole survey area, including the
additional 4.3 acres upon a portion of which
Johnson's residence stands, was blighted and in need
of redevelopment.
The RDA then prepared a
preliminary redevelopment plan, dated November 16,
1992, and published notice of a public hearing to be
held on the consultants' blight survey and the
preliminary redevelopment plan. Johnson and others
filed their first complaint, seeking to delay the
evidentiary hearing regarding blight.
The hearing eventually commenced on February 9th
and was continued over a number of nonconsecutive
days. It was held jointly before the Commission and
the RDA.
Redevelopment experts, real estate
appraisers, and others presented evidence on the
area's blight. On March 8, 1993, the members of
the RDA voted unanimously to designate the entire
survey area, including Johnson's property, as
blighted. The RDA then referred the matter to the
office of the county attorney to prepare written
findings of fact regarding blight.
Although the RDA had already made its preliminary
determination that the survey area was blighted, the
hearing continued on March 16, 1993, to consider
other matters related to the redevelopment project.
At this meeting, Johnson testified that she would
"hold out" and not sell her property to Hermes. On
March 24th, Johnson and others filed an amended
complaint in the district court under section
17A-2-1208(3)(b) of the 1993 Act, seeking de novo
review by the district court of the March 8, 1993,
blight determination. (FN4)
At the time the
complaint was filed, each of the plaintiffs owned
property within the survey area. However, during
the course of the instant legal action, all but Johnson
eventually sold their properties to Hermes.
On April 19th, the RDA directed the county
attorney to exclude the Johnson property from the
redevelopment area.
As a result of this action,
Johnson's property, which was the only parcel
excluded from the proposed redevelopment area, was
left surrounded on three sides by the project. This
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exclusion was effected without any further public
hearings. At this same April 19th meeting, the RDA
and the Commission included provisions in the plan
for the use of eminent domain against any landowners
unwilling to sell to Hermes and confirmed the plan's
authorization *727 of the use of sales taxes from the
project area to pay for the redevelopment project.
On May 5, 1993, while Johnson's action was
pending in the district court, the RDA and the
Commission adopted written, formal findings of fact
regarding blight and prepared an ordinance to create
the Union Fort Neighborhood Redevelopment Project
Area, which excluded the Johnson property.
On
May 24, 1993, after further revisions, the
Commission drafted the final ordinance, which was
passed at the close of the meeting.
On June 23rd, Johnson filed an amended ten-count
complaint challenging, under the 1993 Act, the
regularity and legality of the redevelopment process
and of the resulting plan and ordinance. Specifically,
Johnson sought to invalidate the ordinance passed on
May 24, 1993. Both Johnson and the RDA sought
summary judgment.
On January 12, 1994, the
district court granted the RDA's motions and denied
Johnson's.
On the merits, the district court ruled
that RDA had substantially complied with all of the
applicable provisions of the 1993 Act. The district
court also dismissed Johnson's demand for de novo
review of the March 8th blight finding by holding that
Johnson lacked standing to invoke section
17A-2-1208(3)(b) of the 1993 Act because she was
not an owner of property within the redevelopment
area. Johnson appeals.
[2] [3] [4] We first state the applicable standard of
review. "When no facts are in dispute, a challenge to
a summary judgment presents only conclusions of
law." Texaco, Inc. v. San Juan County, 869 P.2d
942, 943 (Utah 1994).
Furthermore, the proper
construction of the Utah Neighborhood Development
Act is a question of law. See State v. Larsen, 865
P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993); State v. James, 819
P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, we grant
no particular deference to the district court's statutory
interpretations but review them for correctness.
World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency
Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994); accord Ward
v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).
[5] [6] [7] [8] The primary rule guiding us in statutory
interpretation is that we give effect to the intent of the
legislature. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah,
853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993). To discover that
intent, we look first to the plain language of the
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statute. Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1357; Schurtz v. BMW
ofN. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991);
Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah
1989); see also Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497,
500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam) ("Unambiguous
language in [a] statute may not be interpreted to
contradict its plain meaning.").
In construing a
statute, we assume that "each term in the statute was
used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read
literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably
confused or inoperable." Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991).
"Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain
language need we seek guidance from the legislative
history and relevant policy considerations." World
Peace, 879 P.2d at 259; see also Schurtz, 814 P.2d
at 1112 ("We first look to the statute's plain language.
Only if we find some ambiguity need we look
further."); Brinkerhoff, 779 P.2d at 686 ("Where
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this
Court will not look beyond the same to divine
legislative intent.").
Johnson asks this court to invalidate the ordinance
adopting the Fort Union Redevelopment Project on
the ground that the RDA and the Commission failed
to strictly comply with the procedural steps set out in
the 1993 Act. (FN5) Specifically, Johnson claims
that the RDA failed (i) to designate a project area at
the time and in the manner outlined in section *728
17A-2-1206 of the 1993 Act; (ii) to prepare a
preliminary plan at the time and in the manner
outlined in section 17A-2-1208(l) of the 1993 Act;
and (iii) to provide area residents and property owners
with written notice and the opportunity to review and
comment on the preliminary plan as required by
sections 17A-2-1222 through -1225 of the 1993 Act.
Because we find Johnson's second claim dispositive,
we limit our discussion to that issue: to wit, whether
the RDA failed to prepare a preliminary plan in
accordance with the provisions of section -1208(1) of
the 1993 Act. That section provides as follows:
If the redevelopment plan will authorize the use of
eminent domain, the redevelopment project area
described in the redevelopment plan must be a
blighted area and a finding that the area is a
blighted area must be made by the agency at the
time a preliminary plan is prepared, and must be
made by the legislative body prior to adopting the
plan under Section 17A-2-1225.
Utah Code Ann.
added).

§

17A-2-1208(1)
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Before the district court, Johnson argued that the
RDA failed to comply with section -1208(1) because
it made a finding that the area to be included in the
preliminary plan was blighted only after the
preliminary plan was prepared, rather than "at the
time a preliminary plan is prepared," as the 1993 Act
requires. The Commission and RDA's argument in
response is two-fold: (i) that section -1208(1) did not
apply because the preliminary plan was prepared
before that section of the 1993 Act was passed; and
(ii) that even if section -1208(1) applies, they had
"unwittingly complied" with its requirements by
making a "generic" finding of blight at the time they
prepared the preliminary plan and by referencing the
blight survey in the preliminary plan. The district
court agreed with the RDA and the Commission and
ruled that "it appears that a sufficient finding of blight
was in fact made in the Union Fort Preliminary
Plan."
[9] On appeal, the parties simply restate the
positions they took before the district court.
We
begin our analysis with the applicability of section
-1208(1) of the 1993 Act to the Fort Union
Redevelopment Project.
When the legislature substantially rewrote the Utah
Neighborhood Development Act in 1993, it included a
nonretroactivity clause in some, but not all, of the
individual amended sections of the Act. (FN6)
Johnson contends that if the legislature had intended
to exclude all projects then in process from
compliance with the 1993 Act, the legislature would
have placed the nonretroactivity language in one
section at the beginning of the Act and given it a
blanket application or, alternatively, it would have
included the language in each and every amended
section.
Instead, it chose to include a specific
nonretroactivity clause in many, but not all, of the
changed sections.
This indicates an intention to
make only selected provisions have prospective effect.
Because the 1993 Act lacks a blanket nonretroactivity
clause and no such clause is attached to section
-1208(1), the plain language shows a legislative
intention to apply the new provision to all thenpending redevelopment plans. The Commission and
the RDA concede that the nonretroactivity language
does not appear in every new or amended section of
the 1993 Act, but they contend, "It is obvious that the
1993 amendments, read as a whole, indicate that the
legislature intended H.B. 278 [the 1993 amendments]
to apply prospectively and address redevelopment
plans commenced after April 1, 1993."

(emphasis
*729 We agree with Johnson. The fact that the
nonretroactivity language was attached only to certain
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of the amended provisions and not to others is a clear
indication that the legislature intended to exempt
ongoing redevelopment projects only from those
specific sections containing nonretroactivity clauses,
not from the provisions of the 1993 Act as a whole.
Under the construction placed on the 1993 Act by the
Commission and the RDA, in essence, we would
have to read each of the thirty-four nonretroactivity
provisions out of the Act and, at the same time, read
a blanket nonretroactivity provision back into the Act.
This would conflict with the basic tenet of statutory
construction that we assume "each term in the statute
was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read
literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably
confused or inoperable." Savage, 811 P.2d at 670.
[10][11][12][13] Having concluded that section
-1208(1) of the 1993 Act applied to the Fort Union
Redevelopment Project, we must next address the
second issue: whether the RDA and the Commission
complied with section -1208(l)'s requirement that
"[i]f the redevelopment plan will authorize the use of
eminent domain, the redevelopment project area
described in the redevelopment plan must be a
blighted area and a finding that the area is a blighted
area must be made by the agency at the time a
preliminary plan is prepared."
Utah Code Ann. §
17A-2-1208(1) (emphasis added). We proceed with
the understanding that "because redevelopment is a
serious action that may be in derogation of individual
property rights, ... strict compliance with the enabling
legislation is required to enact an ordinance setting up
a redevelopment plan." Murray City Redevelopment,
598 P. 2d at 1344. Although the Utah Neighborhood
Development Act "is broad in scope and must be
interpreted to delegate to the agencies ample power to
serve the purposes of the Act, i.e., to alleviate blight,
it is necessary that the legislation enabling this grant
of authority be strictly followed." Id.
As noted above, section -1208(1) embodies the
concern about the need for careful compliance with
statutory prerequisites because of the potential impact
of redevelopment on individual property owners. It
mandates, "If the redevelopment plan will authorize
the use of eminent domain, the redevelopment project
area described in the redevelopment plan must be a
blighted area and a finding that the area is a blighted
area must be made by the agency at the time a
preliminary plan is prepared."
Utah Code Ann. §
17A-2-1208(1) (emphasis added).
Johnson argues
that the RDA failed to comply with this provision
because it prepared the preliminary redevelopment
plan in November of 1992 but did not formally "find"
that the area comprising the redevelopment was
blighted until March 8, 1993.
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The RDA and the Commission, on the other hand,
argue that the RDA "unwittingly" complied with
section -1208(1) when it prepared the preliminary
plan. According to the RDA and the Commission,
section -1208(1) does not require that the "finding" of
blight "be by resolution, that it be reduced to writing,
or meet any other formal requirement." A "finding"
of blight, as that term is used in section -1208(1),
means nothing more than a "generic" belief by the
RDA that the area is blighted and that it has decided
to prepare a preliminary plan designed to cure that
supposed blight. The RDA notes that it was aware,
as early as February 26, 1992, that the consultant
conducting the blight survey had preliminarily
determined that the area was blighted. It was on the
basis of the consultant's final report, a report that was
ultimately referenced in the preliminary plan, that the
RDA directed that a preliminary plan be prepared.
These actions, contends the RDA, are sufficient to
meet the "generic" finding-of-blight requirement
contained in section -1208(1).
We conclude that section -1208(1) contemplates
much more than the "generic" finding of blight
contended for by the RDA and the Commission. We
reach this result because (i) the term "finding" is
commonly understood to mean a formal, written
determination of fact;
(ii) the RDA and the
Commission's construction of the term "finding" is
inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the
legislature in enacting the Utah Neighborhood
Redevelopment Act;
and (iii) the construction
advocated by the Commission and the RDA is
unworkable when applied to *730 the identical term
as it is used in other subparts of section -1208.
Although the terms "finding" and "finding of blight"
are not defined in the 1993 Act, the term "finding" is
commonly understood to connote a formal, written
determination of a disputed issue by an adjudicative
body. See Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'I Cos., 842 P. 2d
865, 867 (Utah 1992) (noting that in interpreting
meaning of a given word or phrase, "we give effect to
each term according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning").
For instance, Webster's New
International Dictionary defines the term "finding" as
follows: "The result of a judicial examination or
inquiry, esp. into some matter of fact, as embodied in
a jury's verdict or a court's decision or a referee's
report." Webster's New Int'l Dictionary 949 (2d ed.
1954). Furthermore, American Jurisprudence states,
"Findings are a formal, deliberate statement of a
court's determination of facts.... Findings of fact
may be defined as the written statement of the
ultimate facts as found by the court, signed by the
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court, and filed therein, and essential to support the
decision and judgment rendered therein."
75B
Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1968 (1992).
The RDA's
assertion that a "finding" of blight is nothing more
than a general consensus or an informal understanding
among the commissioners that blight exists stands in
stark contrast to the general usage of the term.
More important, the construction the Commission
and the RDA place on section -1208(1) is inconsistent
with the purpose of the 1993 Act. See Sullivan, 853
P. 2d at 880 (noting that primary rule of statutory
construction is to give effect to intent of legislature in
light of purpose statute was meant to achieve). The
purpose behind redevelopment legislation is the
alleviation of blight.
See Murray City
Redevelopment, 598 P. 2d at 1342.
For a
redevelopment agency to address the issue of curing
blight-which cure may involve a "taking" of private
property for public use-the agency must ascertain
with specificity whether and to what extent blight
exists in a survey area. It is for this reason that the
legislature requires a redevelopment agency to make a
formal "finding" that blight exists before it develops a
plan to cure the blight.
Utah Code Ann. §
17A-2-1208(l).
The "generic" finding-of-blight
requirement that the Commission and the RDA
advocate is insufficient to guarantee that the
redevelopment process is driven by the desire to cure
blight rather than by the desire for the economic
development that is promised to follow from a finding
of blight or, in other words, that the cart does not
precede the horse that is supposed to be pulling it.
[14] Finally, as we recently noted in Nixon v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995), we
do not construe a particular section of the Code in the
abstract but, rather, in a manner that is harmonious
with other closely related code provisions. See also
Schurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112-13. Section -1208(3)(b)
of the 1993 Act provides, "Within 30 days after a
finding of blight, ... an owner may appeal [that
finding] to a court of competent jurisdiction." Utah
Code Ann. § 17A-2-1208(3)(b). If we were to adopt
the RDA's informal construction of the term "finding
of blight" for section -1208(1), we would be required
to adopt that same reading for section -1208(3).
Under that reading, property owners would never
know when to appeal an agency's finding of blight
because there would be no requirement that the
finding of blight, in the words of the Commission,
"be by resolution, that it be reduced to writing, or
meet any other formal requirement." (FN7)
[15] Because we cannot give the term "finding of
blight" in section -1208(1) the construction the RDA
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advocates without doing significant damage to the
remaining subsections *731. of section -1208, see
Curtis v. Harmon Elecs., Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 1046
(Utah 1978) (noting presumption that statutes are not
intended to produce undesirable or inequitable
consequences), and because the RDA's reading of the
term is inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the
legislature in adopting the 1993 Act, we conclude that
section -1208(1) contemplates a formal, written
finding that an area is blighted before a preliminary
plan is prepared for that area. Since the RDA did
not make a formal, written finding of blight prior to
or at the time it prepared the preliminary plan and
because "strict compliance with the enabling
legislation is required to enact an ordinance setting up
a redevelopment plan," Murray City Redevelopment,
598 P.2d at 1344, we conclude that the ordinance in
question is invalid.
[16] In addition to asking us to invalidate the
ordinance creating the Fort Union Redevelopment
Plan, Johnson seeks a declaration that she was
"wrongfully denied the opportunity for [de novo] trial
review of the finding of blight," as provided by
section -1208(3) of the 1993 Act. (FN8) Johnson
seeks this declaration because she believes that section
-1208(3)(b) "is one of the most important of the 1993
amendments to the Act." Our resolution of this issue
is governed by our analysis of section -1208(1) set out
above.
[17] We hold that Johnson was not entitled to de
novo judicial review of the blight finding because the
preliminary vote of the Commission on March 8,
1993, which concluded that Johnson's property was
blighted, was not a formal "finding of blight" as that
term is used in section -1208(3) and, therefore, did
not trigger the right to de novo judicial review. The
term "finding of blight" both in section -1208(1) and
in section -1208(3) means a formal, written finding
that an area is blighted. See Nixon, 898 P. 2d at 269.
The RDA and the Commission made a formal,
written finding of blight on May 5, 1993, but the
finding specifically excluded Johnson's property.
Because neither the RDA nor the Commission ever
"found" that Johnson's property was blighted within
the meaning of the statute, the district court did not
err in denying de novo judicial review under section
-1208(3)(b).
Because we conclude that the RDA failed to comply
with the provisions of section -1208(1) and that the
Commission's ordinance adopting the Fort Union
Redevelopment Plan is invalid, we reverse and
remand to the district court to enter judgment in favor
of Johnson in accordance with this opinion.
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STEWART, Associate C.J., and HOWE,
DURHAM and RUSSON, JJ., concur in
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., opinion.
FNl. The RDA is a municipal/county agency
composed of the members of the Salt Lake County
Commission who sit as the RDA to exercise the
powers conferred by statute on redevelopment
agencies.
FN2. The legislature promulgated the original version
of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act in
1969. Utah Neighborhood Development Act, ch.
5, §§ 1-15, 1969 Utah Laws 1134. We will refer
to this version of the statute as the " 1969 Act." In
1993, the legislature substantially rewrote the Act.
Redevelopment Amendments, ch. 50, §§ 1-48, 1993
Utah Laws 325. We will refer to this version of
the statute as the " 1993 Act."
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contest the regularity, formality or legality of the
ordinance. After the 60 day period no person may
contest the regularity, formality or legality of the
ordinance for any cause whatsoever.
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1226.
FN6. The nonretroactivity clause, depending upon the
context of the relevant statutory provision, reads as
follows:
[This section applies to] projects for which a
preliminary plan has been prepared after April 1,
1993, and for which any of the following have
occurred after July 1, 1993: The completion of the
agency blight study, and the good faith
commencement of the hearing by the agency under
Section 17A-2-1221....
[or]

FN3. Before the district court, the parties vigorously
contested the issue of which version of the Act
applied to the Fort Union Redevelopment Plan.
Because the district court ruled that the RDA and
the Commission had complied with the more
stringent requirements of the 1993 Act, it concluded
that it did not need to address the issue of which
version of the Act applied to Johnson's claims.
FN4. Section 17A-2-1208(3)(b) of the 1993 Act states
as follows:
Within 30 days after a finding of blight under
Section 17A-2-1206 or 17A-2-1225, an owner may
appeal a finding of blight by an agency or governing
body to a court of competent jurisdiction.
The
court shall review that finding of blight de novo, and
the agency shall maintain the burden of proof
regarding blight.
FN5. We note that as a "person in interest," Johnson
has standing to challenge the legality and regularity
of the ordinance under section 17A-2-1226 of the
Utah Code, which provides:
The legislative body by ordinance may adopt the
redevelopment plan in its original form or as
modified as the official redevelopment plan for the
project area.
For a period of 60 days after
publication of the ordinance adopting the
redevelopment plan, any person in interest may

[This section does not apply to] projects for which a
preliminary plan has been prepared prior to April 1,
1993, and for which all of the following have
occurred prior to July 1, 1993: The agency blight
study has been completed, and a hearing under
Section 17A-2-1221 has in good faith been
commenced by the agency....
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1207.
*731_ FN7. The Commission seems to recognize this
fact in its brief.
In its discussion of section
-1208(3), the Commission urges this court to hold
that "Johnson's action challenging the finding of
blight was premature, because it was filed prior to
the entry of the [RDA's] and the Commission's
[written] Findings of Fact regarding blight." The
Commission moves on to argue that its oral finding
of blight made on March 8, 1993, was not, in fact,
a formal finding of blight, but was more akin to an
unsigned minute entry. As such, the Commission
argues, the oral finding of blight was not sufficient
to trigger the right to de novo judicial review set out
in section -1208(3).
Curiously, the Commission
makes this argument, while at the same time
arguing that the finding of blight required by section
-1208(1) need only be generic and informal.
FN8. For the text of section -1208(3)(b), see supra
note 4.
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THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, Mr. Olsen.

3

Both sides have done an excellent job in

4

presenting to me their twist of the matter.

My analysis

5

has been over a couple of days, because I have had

6

opportunity to prepare for this hearing and it's sort of

7

like a tennis match:

8

I read the other side, I'm on that side.

9

look at this in a practical light, that if I denied the

I read one side, I'm on that side.
But I have to

10

motion to dismiss at this time and we proceed further, and

11

in fact I'm incorrect as to the caution of the remedies

12

that Mr. Colessides says, then if the matter proceeds and

13

there is an adverse judgment on behalf of the

14

plaintiffs —

15

prevail on appeal in this matter.

16

on behalf of defendants, then he's going to

On the other hand, if I were crystal clear and

17

certain that those positions taken by plaintiffs in this

18

matter would overcome any appeal process, I would feel

19

much more comfortable in ruling against the motion for

20

summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings.

21

I have to look at it in the light of the

22

practical aspects of this matter.

I think that since both

23

sides have supplemented, somewhat, their memorandum by

24

oral argument, and especially Mr. Colessides, and now

25

referring to the county ordinance, that is why I took the

2
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1

approximately 45, 50-minute break to allow both sides to,

2

number one, educate the court as well as educate

3

themselves as to the procedures involved here.

4

While I do recognize, Mr. Olsen, that this is not

5

an appeal, but it appears to me, though the general scheme

6

of administrative remedies, regardless if you call it an

7

appeal or not an appeal, is to allow the County to tend to

8

their own business.

9

opportunity to rectify any wrings that there may be, and

To allow the County to have first

10

to follow through before litigation is contemplated in

11

district court.

12

On the other hand, I do recognize the case of

13

Mason v. State as controlling on the facts as indicated.

14

But it was my distinct recollection as to previous hearing

15

which have been referred to in both memorandum —

16

in yours, Mr. Olsen, that the court ruled adverse to a

17

temporary restraining order on the sole issue —

18

it was in your memorandum —

19

not find irreparable harm.

20

if not

I think

on the sole issue that I did

The irreparable harm alleged at that time was the

21

inability to have adequate ingress and egress into the

22

property as owned by those property owners surrounded by

23

the 7240 South, the North Union Avenue up until the time

24

it was closed, and I cannot see the north south street

25

designated.
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1

MR. COLESSIDES:

2

THE COURT:

3

It's 10

~

The one to the right of 1035 East,

what's that street number?

4

MR. COLESSIDES:

This is this one here.

5

the vacation ordinance easement.

It is

It does not have a name.

6

THE COURT: Right.

7

MR. COLESSIDES:

8

THE COURT: And so in that regard there has been

9

It's that 25-foot easement.

no showing to my satisfaction in anything addition to what

10

I previously ruled on.

11

as to 17-27-1001, in addition to the county ordinance, has

12

not been complied with.

13

I further find that the provisions

What I'm going to do, I'm going to dismiss this

14

matter without prejudice — without prejudice, that is

15

emphasized —

16

wish to, your administrative remedies, and then have

17

leave, if after that time there has been no resolution to

18

your satisfaction, through the —

19

through the board of planning —

20

through the Board of County Commissioners and the Board of

21

Adjustment, then you do have leave, without prejudice, to

22

refile the matter.

23

allowing you to exhaust whatever means you

I also take —

through Mr. Jones,
the Planning Commission,

and I would ask that you receive a

24

copy of the transcript in this matter, Mr. Olsen, for

25

those positions taken by Mr. Colessides, in that you are
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1

not going to be prejudiced by any waiver of time.

2

It is my indication from listening to you,

3

Mr. Colessides, that you're maintaining that it is a

4

continuing problem and that there will be no waiver of

5

time, and your position taken before me today, and I

6

expect that no contrary position be taken in further

7

litigation —

8
9

MR. COLESSIDES:

exception of the vacation ordinance.

10
11

That's correct with the

THE COURT: And the vacation ordinance is subject
to a previous order that I made.

12

MR. COLESSIDES:

Right. As it relates, your

13

Honor, to enforcement of 1186 and to the conditional use

14

permit, I respectfully submit to the court that so long as

15

there is a continuous development, that is a continuous

16

enforcement problem, and therefore, there is not —

17

that sense there is no time limitations.

18

THE COURT:

in

The reason why I state that,

19

Mr. Olsen, the court is relying somewhat upon

20

Mr. Colessides's position in that matter in rendering the

21

decision, which in my opinion would minimize whatever

22

prejudice, if any, would be to the plaintiffs in this

23

matter.

24
25

All I'm asking you to start again, go through the
procedures.

If at that time you're at the same posture as

COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION
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1

you are now, you will have leave to refile.

2

not —

3

the computer will spit out.

4

as to the —

5

based upon the responses and the allegations, and it will

6

be dismissed without prejudice to follow those procedures

7

as I have indicated.

it may or may not come to me.

8
9

It will

I don't know what

But that would be my ruling

this would be the judgment on the pleadings

Mr. Colessides, could you draft up the
appropriate order.

10

MR. COLESSIDES: Yes, your Honor.

11

leave of the court to wait until Nora prepares the

12

transcript of these proceedings, your Honor, so that I can

13

use those to have the order?

14

May I have

THE COURT: And please submit it to Mr. Olsen

15

prior to the court's submission so this matter can be

16

moved on.

17

MR. COLESSIDES:

18

THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

Thank you.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:

SS.

County of Salt Lake )
I, Nora S. Worthen, do certify that I am a

5

Certified Shorthand Reporter and Official Court Reporter

6

in and for the State of Utah; that as such reporter, I

7

reported the occasion of the proceedings of the

8

above-entitled matter at the aforesaid time and place.

9

That the proceeding was reported by me in stenotype using

10

computer-aided transcription real-time technology

11

consisting of pages 3 through 7 inclusive.

12

constitutes a true and correct transcription of the bench

13

ruling in said proceedings.

14

That the same

That I am not of kin or otherwise associated with

15

any of the parties herein or their counsel, and that I am

16

not interested in the events thereof.

17
18

WITNESS my hand at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 3rd
day of April, 1995.

19
20
21
22
24

Nora S. Worthen, RPR
Utah License No. 22-106373-7801
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EXHIBIT G

ViUO DISTRICT TORT
APR 1 4 1995
NICK J COLESSIDES (# 696)
Attorney at Law
466 South 400 East, Suite
Salt Lake City, Utah 8;i J-3325
Tele: (801) 521-4441

,_^$6—

Attorney for defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY , STATE ill'' UTAH
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON,
J. BLAINE JOHNSON,
EVA C. JOHNSON, and
DIANE PEARL MEIBOS,

.

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY, and
COMMISSIONER E. JAMES
BRADLEY, COMMISSIONER
RANDY HORIUCHI and
COMMISSIONER BRENT
OVERSON, individually,
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V- GLENN K. IWASi
4,/^r*' District Court Judge

APPROVE™

MARTIN N. OLSEN
Attorney for pla intiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Served a copy of the foregoing to:
MR MARTIN OLSEN ESQ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
OLSEN & OLSEN
8138 SOUTH STATE STRLIET
MIDVALE UTAH 84047
MR KENT LEWIS ESQ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
2001 SOUTH STATE STREET # S 3600
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84190-1200
by mailing the same, first class mail,,,postage prepaid, this
J yr
day of April, \99^"\
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THIS BEING THE TIME HERETOFORE SCHEDULED

3$TH, A-PT J *?94

for a public hearim-

for

Applicatioi i #PL-94-7001 - 'Hermes Associates in regard to a Btreet vacat - or.
East North Union Avenue (7310 South), C-2 & R-2-10 zones/Union.
Mr. Bill Marsh, Development Services Section Manager, stated that
this is ai i item being considered for a street vacation. The application was
submitted to the Planning Commission requesting a vacation of certain streets in
the Union Fort area - the vacation of the streets would help accommodate the

9
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expansion of the Family Center.
As they look at the aerial photograph, he
pointed out several key points - the canal, boundary of existing Family Center,
Union Park Avenue (1300 East), South Union Avenue, North Union Avenue where they
access to 1300 East and 1000 East. The areas outlined in the red, yellow and
green are the areas to be vacated and some of them have roads on them now, some
of them would be partial vacations of existing right-of-ways, some are areas that
don't have roads on them now, but should be included in the vacation. There are
some areas in a public right-of-way that have structures located on them - 1000
East (map) there is a home that appears to be located within the right-of-way.
The Planning Commission reviewed this application on riarch 22, 1994, approving
the request to vacate the Btreets and recommending the County Commission vacate
those streets.
Commissioner Overson reminded the Commission that this hearing was
held once before (April 25, 1994) and the only thing that was flawed was the
notice to the most impacted property owner, who is present today.
Mr. Marsh indicated that they double checked the list and made sure
that the property owner-of-record was notified and that the relative that had
interest was also notified.
Mr. Reese Jensen, Hermes Associates, stated that this is a redo of
what occurred on the 25th of April and is being redone this evening to correct
the technical flaw of insufficient notice.
He has in his hand a copy of a
document dated February 28, 1994, which was executed by Chairman Bradley on
behalf of the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County and he made a brief quote
from Attachment #5 to this document, page 57 which is the agencies undertakings

and further on page 70 "upon petition
of the developer,
the agency will seek to
have the county commence the statutory
vacation process of the public
streets,
roads and public right-of-ways
no longer needed as part of the development on the
site as shown and described in Attachment 9." He would simply observe that they
are eager to move forward and has in his hand a copy of the document that has
been prepared by Mr. Nick Colessides, Attorney for Hermes, granting a nonexclusive easement to Eva C. Johnson to provide continuing access to the property
and that has been discussed with Mr. Kent Lewis of the County Attorney's office
and they have Mr. Richard Miller who has prepared tho technical work And hnn
interacted with Brent Tidwell, Development Engineering Administrator. All of the
proper documentation is in place and they are here to request that what happened
on the 25th will repeated this evening in approval.
Commissioner Bradley stated that for the record, he may have executed
that document, but he voted against it.
Mr. Nolan Olson, Olsen & Olsen, Attorney, stated that he sent the
Commissioners a letter dated the 12th day of May, 1994, referring to some case
law. There isn't any question in his mind that if they vacate this road, they
probably have a right to do so, but if they vacate it, his client's property goes
to tho middle of the road. Under the Mason vs. State case, if they vacate it
they need to give his client to the middle of the road. His clients are Eva
Johnson and Eleana Gulbertson, Mr. Croxford is dead, and they own the .91 of an
acre on North Union Avenue. When the county vacates this property, they have a
provision that walls them in on the north side or south side of North Union
Avenue. How can they be walled in when the law says they get the property if
vacated - it has to go to the abutting land owner. They can't be walled in on
the north side of North Union Avenue/ if they are going to be walled in, they
have to be walled in in the middle, of the road - that's the law.
He has
furnished this to the County Attorney's office.
They have to give them
reasonable access - the Mason case specifically provides that they not only have
to give them reasonable access, egress and ingress, but they have to be on a
public access. What they heard Mr. Jensen just say was that they were going to
give them an easement across their property - the county is going to give this
road to Hermes. The county can't give this road to Hermes, if they are going to
do anything, it has to give this road to his clients to the middle of the road.
They have to provide them access to a public road, not across Hermes property,
but public access - that's the law. If they vacate this road tonight and they
tell Hermes to go in and start digging that road up, his people have no way to
get to their property.
If the county does anything, he would expect this
Commission to have at least enough courtesy to hold that off for a ten-day period
until they can get a court hearing to determine if this Commission can vacate
this road, can give that property to Hermes, or do they have to give it to his
clients - that's the law. He doesn't think the county really cares at this
point-on-time because the county has a contract with Hermes that says that Hermes
is going to take all of the responsibility of lawsuits against this County
Commission, but basically how does this Commission look in relation to this, they
lose two to one on every vote, but how does this Commiscion look if in fact they
vacate this road and say that Hermes gets it, what is Hermes paying for it.
Nothing. There is some law that say they have to pay if they vacate, but it also
specifically provides that the abutting landowner gets to the middle of the road
and his clients description goes to the middle of the road - they can't vacate
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that property and have Hermes put a wall up on the north side or south side of
North Union Avenue and then say that they can come onto Hermes property to try
and get out of their property, that isn't proper. He doesn't expect a favorable
vote from this Commission, but he does expect this Commission to give them some
time to get an injunction against this Commission to vacate this road,
Commissioner Horiuchi asked Mr, Kent Lewis, Deputy County Attorney,
if he would respond to this matter. It is his understanding that only part of
this road will be vacated, but any portion there io rpiwhnrppmonf back to the
county for that matter as he understands it.
HI i:

o J i en, J nd i c a t ecl t h a t t h e who • < • - •. i • - - ** ?.

"

* i e vac a t e d •

M r , Lewis stated that it is their recommendation that t h e portion in
front of C r o x f o r d s not be vacated, but permanently closed, at least twenty-five
feet, and then t h e e a s e m e n t s b e granted t o both H e r m e s and t h e C r o x f o r d s , so it
w o n ' t g o a s a m a t t e r of law to t h e abutting property o w n e r s - it will still
remain in t h e public d o m a i n , b u t an easement b e granted across it. M r . Olsen is
correct in stating that under t h e law w h e n a public road is vacated they have t o
p r o v i d e r e a s o n a b l e alternative access t o t h e property and that is t h e issue this
C o m m i s s i o n h a s to d e c i d e a s t o w h e t h e r that is reasonable a l t e r n a t i v e a c c e s s .
O b v i o u s l y , they say it isn't and Hermes b e l i e v e s that it i s , so that is what
their d e c i s i o n i s
C o m m i s s i o n e r Bradley asked him to say that again.
M r . L e w i s stated that when they close a public road arid it is o n e
they have a right t o u s e , they have a private easement across that s t i l l , unless
r e a s o n a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e access is provided.
T h e issue for them to d e c i d e is
w h e t h e r t h e alternati ve acceso still g i v e s them reasonable acceso to their
property.
C o m m i s s i o n e r Bradley asked what t h e be :::: I: i t i I i til ne public d o m a i n ,

•

•«

o m -*KI.*£

M r . L e w i s stated that if they vacate it, ao a m a t t e r of law, it goes
equally to the abutting o w n e r s , even without any c o n v e y a n c e s . If they v a c a t e i t ,
half of it would g o t o H e r m e s and half t o the C r o x f o r d s - if they keep it in
public o w n e r s h i p , t h e public interest and t h e public o w n e r s h i p , but close i t ,
then they could convey easements so both of them could have access to their
p r o p e r t i e s across that t w e n t y - f i v e feet and that is what t h e recommendation would
be t o avoid t h e problem of t h e title transferring automatically t o both property
owners.
Co mm J i s ,1 o n e r B r a d 1 e y a s k e d w h o d e t e i: m i, n e s 11 i a t e a s e m e n t.
M r. L e w J s s t a t e d t h a t t h e y d o
what Comm i o si o n er Brad1e y me ant)

t h i n In t h e i r d e c i s i o n (h e w a s n * t s u r e

C o m m i s s i o n e r Bradley
d e t e r m i n e s - there is an access?

hey vacate

C o m m i s s i o n e r O v e r s o n indicated that they v<
If they follow t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , they won't have •
OI oen
There ia an, acceeo

t h e road,

wl »o

vacating the road.
problem alleged by M r .

M r . L e w i s stated that they w e r e vacating t h e road, e x c e p t for this
one piece if they d o w h a t is recommended t o solve t h i s problem.
From his
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , Hermes is going to grant access from a public road to their road
and t h e issue for them to decide is if this is a reasonable alternative a c c e s s .
C o m m i s s i o n e r Bradley asked M r . Marsh is h e could show them, on, t h e m a p
- he wanted to k n o w if they have seen t h e proposed access ( y e s ) .
M r . Marsh located the Croxford property and stated that as they look
at the plat t h e public street looks like it is paved to here and looks like a
dirt road u p t o that point from that small ditch going east that h a s been
formally v a c a t e d . T h e proposal for t h e access would b e that they w o u l d come u p
this p u b l i c right-of-way (map) and Hermes would provide a right-of-way u p t h e
side of their property and across t h e front of t h e vacated road. T h e r e are t w o
structures on the Croxford property - o n e is located there (map) and t h e other
is there - those d r i v e w a y s currently come out to the n o r t h , so access would b e
up the public street, u p the right-of-way, across the front of t h e property so
they could access those t w o h o m e s .
% -

•

C o m m i s s i o n e r Bradley asked If there w a s a m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e r i g h t - o f oroposed.
C o m m i s s i o n e r o v e r s o n do/veu b y v/hoiTi.
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Commissioner Bradley stated by anyone*
Commissioner Overson stated that this is the one being proposed by
their staff and attorney - there isn't any other alterative proposal before them,
Mr. Nick Colessldes stated that he would like to address the issue
of access. They will note that presently the Croxford or Johnson property has
access on two fronts - the south and north part. The county is being asked to
vacate the north portion of the street and also to leave in the public domain,
part of that portion. By Hermes giving a twenty-five foot easement on the west
side of the street, as Mr. Graham pointed out earlier, the property now has
access on three places - north, south and west. The issue raised by Mr. Olsen
of the money has been addressed - the issue of consideration has been raised in
the RDA/Hermes agreement and they will note that the appropriate department, Real
Estate through Roger Hillam, is ascertaining the cost of this particular vacation
of road and will be dealt with in accordance with that agreement. By asking the
Commission to do exactly what it is being asked to do, that is to vacate that
portion of the road except twenty-five feet directly north of the Croxford
property and by allowing Hermes to give them the access of twenty-five feet on
the west side, they will have proper access to their property and at the same
time, the issue of consideration will be resolved in accordance with the
agreement. They are meeting all of the obligations, both the spirit and intent,
of what is being asked to be done here.
Mr. Robert Hale, a resident of the area, stated that the access that
appears on the last drawing he saw was that this twenty-five easement was
immediately adjacent to a loading dock, a loading entrance. There is no other
docks space for the two proposed buildings that are going to go in right there
(map) and that this would serve as their loading dock. They would, perhaps, have
to share this easement with semi-trucks, piggy-backs or whatever else is going
in there and this doesn't sound proper.
Commissioner Bradley asked if this was correct.
Mr. Reese Jensen showed them the plat and the access (couldn't hear
what was being said).
Mr. Hale stated that the reason this project isn't moving forward is
that it isn't being done right or well. It wasn't the right use for the property
for all concerned. He thinks that Hermes is very protective of their property
rights - if they are relying on access into the Croxfords through an easement,
there may be future problems for those that have to use that easement. He, for
one, was confronted by the managing owner of Hermes Associates and asked to leave
their property while he was on a public access area, on a sidewalk, collecting
petitions for a referendum. He has a feeling that should there be other problems
of discord, of rights-of-use, that an easement could be withdrawn by Hermes, as
well as they have previously confronted those on a public access parts of their
property.
Commissioner Overson stated that the easement comes from the county,
not Hermes.
Commissioner Horiuchi stated that if they grant it in perpetuity, he
suspects that it would only be the county that could remove it - Hermes couldn't.
i

Mr. Colessidos stated that it would be a permanent easement that goes
with the property and cannot be withdrawn.
Mr. Hale stated that this road is used by thousands of vehicles every
day, it is a vital use in their community - the traffic patterns have been well
documented and it is a heavily used road. Neighbors use it every day and the
access to this neighbors property is seriously harmed, the safety and location
of the home would be seriously jeopardized. How could they find 1020 East North
Union Avenue with a wall and three stores around it if there should be a fire or
emergency needs - he seriously questions whether that house could be located in
the needs that would be there.
Water rights along this, road needs to be
protected and they need to address that issue. The Union Ditch leaves Little
Cottonwood Creek, comes through this property, along the back side of this road
that is going to be proposed to be the access for the Croxford property and they
need to make sure that water rights are maintained through that property.
Mr. Olsen stated that they have a petition to vacate a road, that is
what is before this Commission and now they are changing it in the middle of the
stream and saying that they aren't going to vacate that road, etc. He is telling
them that they are going to vacate that road and vote on vacating that road or
else they are going to bring it up, republish and do it over again. If they
vacate the road, they get half of it, that is the law. Give them their half of
the road, that's fine, go ahead and vacate it, give Hermes the one-half and them
the other half, but they can't do both. If they want to change it, republish.
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25TH, A . D . ,

C oim n 1 mi il CHI in Uradlsy aoked Mr, Lew In firm n nil I mi

1994

It is poo ted as

a vacati on
Commissioner Horiuchi ulaLed that obviously wiliun £onxng BicuacionB
they modify zoning issues at will, conditional uses within the scope of their
responsibility and authority.
If they decided, for example, not to grant
anything tonight, that might be contrary to the issue and they would have to renotice that they were saying no.
Mr, Lewis stated that if they don't vacate it, they are under no
obligation, but to close it, it io more or loos a loooor remody.
Tho potitlon
is to vacate and they can, vacate or not vacate, they can do something less.
Comm i • s i o n «i (J v a r i o n a o ke d i f t h e y co u 1 d vacate pa rt a nd n o t t he re s t
of it.
Mr. Lewis stated that this is what they are being proposed to do to vacate all of it except for this portion, but to close that portion, which is
less than vacating it. They can litigate that as to whether they have to start
over to close it, rather than vacate it, but he thinks it io. a lesser included.
Commissioner Overion stated that it sounds to him that all of the
attorney's are making their preliminary arguments for a court case and he moves
that they close the public hearing and move forward with this.
M r Allan Mo 11, D epu t y Cou n ty At to rn • y, s t a t«d t h a t t h • y w 1.11 i iot e
that all of the agenda says is street vacation and that 1 s generic enougl i to
support what Mr. Lewis is suggesting.
M r . Reed Boggesa stated that there are two streets, Middle Lane and
North Lane, with North Lane becoming North Union Avenue and Middle Lane is the
one they are talking about that is south of the Croxford property. Approximately
twenty years ago Joe Overt sold his house/px'operty to Hermes, the canal was moved
over and Harmons built.
Everyone in the Port area agreed to sell to Hermes,
except for Croxford and if they don't want to sell, they don't need to sell, but
everyone else did and he has talked to many who have moved and they are enjoying
their new location.
He bets that this will be worked out and they will have a
beautiful project there.
Commissions! Bradley

c, Losed the hearing at H I I H

time.

Commissioner Horiuchi made a Hiution to vacate thtt stttets as
requested in the petition which will include the streets within the platted
description and as they are located on the ground, except for a twenty-five wide
segment of street abutting the Croxford/Johnson property on North Union Avenue.
They will permanently close, but not vacate that section of the street as a
public street and convey access easements across it to the Croxfords and Hermes.
This decision is subject to the Engineer's and Attorney's Offices working out
legal descriptions in the form of the ordinance and that they direct staff, Mr.
Marsh and members of the Development Services staff, to work out a restriction
on the kinds of vehicles that can access that basic easement (the idea being that
semis shouldn't be there and other similar type v e h i c l e s ) .
They can do this
since they will have basically, ownership remaining in the public domain, they
will be able to control that and this type of control mechanism should be worked
out within the staff with consideration being made to the Croxfords so they don't
have those type of semis or giant vehicles intruding on their lives.
Mr, Marsh stated that there wan one other thing they should consider.
There are some utili ty easements that may need to 'bo accommodated, so those need
to be worked out.
Commissioner Horiuchi asked that they woi k t llteiM* out
easements as well as a staff - this is him motion.

t he

utility

Commissioner Bradley called for a vote on the motion - vacate the
streets as requested in the petition which will include the streets within the
platted description and as they are located on the ground, except for a twentyfive wide segment of street abutting the Croxford/Johnson property on North Union
Avenue. They will permanently close, but not vacate that section of the street
as a public street and convey access easements across it to the Croxfords and
Hermes.
This decision io subject to the Engineer's and Attorney's Offices
working out legal descriptions in the form of the ordinance and that they direct
staff, Mr. Marsh and members of the Development Services staff, to work out a
restriction on the kinds of vehicles that can access that basic easement {the
idea being that semis shouldn't be there and other similar type v e h i c l e s ) , and
that they work out the utility easements as well as a staff, authorizing
evelopment Services and the County Attorney to effect same, whereupon roll was
called and showed the vote to bo: Commissioner Dradley "Nay," Commissioner
Horiuchi "Aye" and Commissioner Overson "Aye."
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EXHIBIT J

NELSON v. PROVO CITY
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Boyd NELSON, Lorraine Nelson, Steven
Whitlock, and Sheila Whitlock,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation,
Defendant and Appellee.
No. 930227-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 23, 1994.

Following city's purported vacation of
roadway, abutting landowners brought suit
seeking to establish their reversionary interests to middle of road. City counterclaim^
for quiet title to roadway. The Fourth District Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif,
J , entered final judgment awarding legal and
equitable title of roadway to city, and abutting landowners appealed. The Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held that: (1) city did not
acquire fee simple title to dedicated roadway
by virtue of Federal Townsite Act, but held
roadway only in trust, with corresponding
fiduciary duties to collective occupants of
city, and (2) city did not properly vacate
roadway, even assuming that it could do so in
its capacity as trustee.
Reversed and remanded

1. Dedication <s=>53
City did not acquire fee simple title to
dedicated ioad\va\ bv virtue of Federal
Townsite Act, and could not acquire such
title unless it I evened ioadwa\ foi public
u-e D\ ootaimng a deed until such time a n
held roadua} in trust onl>, with corresponding fiduciary duties to occupants of town
U C A1953, 57-7-8, 57-7-17, 43 U.S C.(1970
Ed) § 718
2. Municipal Corporations <s»657(7)
Even assuming that city could properly
vacate roadway which it held only in trust for
occupants of city, any interest that city held
after vacating roadway would still be held in
trust, and not in absolute ownership.

3. Municipal Corporations £»657(7)
When municipality has but a determmable fee and does not own underlying fee
simple to roadway, vacation of roadway results in fee reverting to abutting landowners.
4. Municipal Corporations <M>57(7)
When municipality owns underlying fee
to roadway, proper vacation of roadway
would not change municipality's nght to underlying fee.
5. Municipal Corporations G»657(5)
Roadway was not properly vacated,
where city failed to notify abutting landowners, or to notify its citizens generally pursuant to statute until after purported vacation.
U.CJU953, 10-8-8.4.

James G. Clark (argued), Provo, for appellants.
Gary Gregerson, Provo City Atty^ and
David Dixon, Asst. City Atty. (argued), Provo, for appellee.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and DAVIS,
JJ.
OPINION
DAVIS, Judge:
Appellants (Landowners) appeal a final
judgment concluding that appellee Provo
City (City) holds legal and equitable title (fee
simple) to the portion of 900 South between
100 East and Unnersity Avenue (Roadway)
abutting Landownei > property We ie\erse
and remand
Pursuant to the Fecleial Town-ate \c* ot
1W* the fedeial government deeded tht
Roadway along with the abutting lands in
trust to the local municipal authonty, Provo
Mayor Abraham 0 Smoot, as trustee (the
Townsite Conveyance) The Roadway existed as a public thoroughfare prior to this
conveyance The parties do not dispute that
Landowners' predecessors in interest did not
occupy the Roadway or the abutting property at the time of the Townsite Conveyance.
Nor do they dispute that the metes and
bounds of each subsequent conveyance ran to
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the Roadway but did not specifically exclude
it.
In 1871, Smoot deeded land north of the
Roadway to James Dunn, who in 1876 deeded the parcel to Peter Stubbs. In 1982, a
portion of the Stubbs parcel was deeded to
appellants Stephen Whitlock and Sheila
Whitlock. In 1985, Stephen Whitlock alone
received another portion of the Stubbs parcel. Finally, in 1991, appellants Boyd Nelson
and Lorraine Nelson received a deed for
another portion of the Stubbs parcel.
In 1875, Smoot deeded land south of the
Pvoadway to John P.R. Johnson, as trustee of
the First Ward Pasture Company. In 1927,
First Ward Pasture Company deeded its parcel to City. 900 South continued to be used
as a public roadway.
In its regularly scheduled meeting of August 22, 1989, the Provo Municipal Council
passed ordinance number 0-89-055, which
purported to vacate and set aside the Roadway. After passing the ordinance, City published notice one time in the Provo Daily
Herald on August 31, 1989. City mailed no
notice of the vacation to the abutting landowners either before or after the fact. City
then rerouted a portion of 900 South onto the
property it owned to the south of the original
route and sold the vacated portion of the
original route to a commercial developer.
The vacation of the Roadway landlocked one
lot and deprived two other lots of access to
900 South.
Landowners sued City claiming a reversionary interest in the Roadway from their
property lines to the middle of the Roadway.
They sought compensation and, in the alternative, the setting aside of the vacation.
City counterclaimed for quiet title to the
Roadway.
On July 6,1992, the trial court quieted title
in City as against Landowners, concluding
that City held fee simple title since the time
of the Townsite Conveyance. Landowners
moved for specific findings regarding City's
compliance with the Townsite Act and with
the State Township Act. The trial court
denied the motion. Landowners appeal.
1. Thefollowingexchange between senators illus-

CITY'S INTEREST IN ROADWAY
Landowners claim the court erred in concluding the Townsite Conveyance conveyed a
fee simple interest to City because (1) the
patent, when read in context of the Townsite
Act, conveyed the Roadway to City in trust
only, and (2) City failed to reserve the Roadway for public use pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 57-7-8 or -17 (1990).
United States Patent
[1] In 18G7, the United States Congress
passed the Townsite Act, also known as "An
Act of Congress for the Relief of the Inhabitants of the Cities and Towns upon Public
Lands." Federal Townsite Act, ch. 177, 14
Stat. 541 (1867), codified as 43 U.S.C. § 718,
repealed by P.L. 94-579, Title VII, § 703(a),
90 Stat. 2789 (1973). This act enabled town
corporate authorities, as trustees, to acquire
federally-owned property for their towns.
The property was acquired
in trust for the several use and benefit and
use of the occupants thereof, according to
their respective interests; the execution of
which trust, as to the disposal of the lots in
such town, and the proceeds of the sales
thereof, to be conducted under such rules
and regulations as may be prescribed by
the legislative authority of the State or
Territory in which the same may be situated.
Id.
The Townsite Act limited townsite lands to
those "actually occupied by the town and the
title to which is in the United States." Id.
The Townsite Act provided that the local
legislative authority could make regulations
for the disposition of the townsite lands. Id.
However, "any act of said trustees not made
in conformity to the rules and regulations
herein alluded to shall be void." Id. See
Hall v. North Ogden City, 109 Utah 325, 175
P.2d 703, 705 (1946).
Conveyances pursuant to the Townsite Act
transferred title to town authorities in trust
for the collective occupants. Conversely,
town authorities could not hold the land as
purchasers.1
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the
Townsite Act to mean that conveyances
trates the intent of the Townsite Act that town
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thereunder served to transfer equitable ownership of a parcel of land to an occupant only
if the parcel was occupied at the time of
transfer. Hall 175 P.2d at 705. Hall does
not address the issue before us: whether a
municipality has fee simple to a dedicated
roadway where the abutting land was unoccupied at the time the town acquired it.2
Still, the language of the Townsite Act is
clear that conveyances thereunder served to
transfer land in trust to the municipality as
trustee and not as absolute owner.
Disposing Legislation
Landowners claim that City could not acquire title to 900 South under the patent
unless Smoot reserved the street for public
use by obtaining a deed. We agree.
The Townsite Act provided that the local
legislative authority could make regulations
for the disposition of the townsite lands and
"any act of said trustees not made in conformity to the rules and regulations herein
alluded to shall be void." 43 U.S.C. § 718.
Utah's disposing legislation is found in Utah
Code Ann. § 57-7-1 to -19 (1990).
Section 57-7-17 of the current code, and
all predecessor statutes, provides as follows:
Lots or parcels of land necessary for
streets . . . may be reserved by the city
commissioners, the mayor, the president of
the board of trustees or the district judge,
as the case may be; and he [or she] may
authorities could not purchase the land, but must
hold it in trust for the collective occupants:
Mr. Howard: Docs the Senator from California mean to be understood that this bill provides that the corporate authorities of the town
may become the purchasers? Is that the
scheme here 0
Mr. Conness: No, sir.
Mr. Howard: I so understood him.
Mr. Conness: They simply enter the land as
agents in trust for the occupants, those in
possession.
Mr. Howard: Do they get a title?
Mr. Conness: A title for the occupants from
the United States.
Mr. Howard: Then they become the owners in
trust.
Mr. Conness: In trust. That is it exactly.
Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1109
(1867).
2. City cites Loeber v. Butte General Electric, 16
Mont. 1, 39 P. 912 (1895) for the proposition that
the municipality holds fee simple title as absolute

execute and deliver to the proper party a
deed for any property set aside for such
purposes.
Section 57-7-8 provides:
If a city commissioner or the mayor of
any city or the president of the board of
trustees of any town shall be a claimant of
lands in such city or town, the recorder or
the clerk thereof, as the case may be, shall,
upon the certificate of the district court
made as in the case of other claimants,
execute a deed of conveyance to such
claimant for the lands finally adjudged to
him [or her] by the court.
In short, the Townsite Act, along with the
state's disposing legislation, provide that a
townsite conveyance transferred land to a
municipality in trust. In order for the municipality to own the land for itself, it, like
any other claimant, would have to obtain a
deed.
Here, the parties agree that City never
explicitly reserved the Roadway or obtained
a deed to the Roadway pursuant to section
57-7-3 or -17. Thus, City remains holder of
the Roadway in trust City purported to
vacate the Roadway as absolute owner, without regard to its responsibilities as trustee or
the provisions of Title 57. Accordingly, we
remand this matter to the trial court to
consider City's role as trustee of the Roadway, with its attendant fiduciary duties to the
beneficiaries, in this case, the collective occupants of the town. See 43 U.S.C. § 718.
owner to a street derived from a townsite conveyance. In Loeber, the disputed alley had been
included in the original townsite survey and the
abutting land had been occupied at the time of
the townsite transfer. The issue of whether the
municipality held the alley in fee simple or as a
determinable fee was not beiore the court. The
court held that because the alley in question had
been dedicated to public use before the conveyance of the lot, the abutting landowner "was not
the owner in fee of the alley" and thus the
abutting landowner could not complain of the
installation of electric poles in the alley. Id. 39
P. at 913. This holding is not helpful to resolution of this case because it does not resolve
whether the municipality held a determinable fee
or an absolute fee in the alley. The municipality
in Loeber needed only to have held a determinable fee or even an easement to permit installation of the electric poles.
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DETERMINABLE FEE
[2] Landowners claim the trial court
erred in failing to conclude that upon vacation of the Roadway, the fee to the center
line of the Roadway would revert to them as
abutting property owners.
[3,4] Utah case law relies on common
law to support the theory that where a municipality has but a determinable fee 3 and
does not own the underlying fee simple, the
vacating of the roadway results in the fee
reverting to the abutting landowners. Sears,
572 P.2d at 1363; White v. Salt Lake City,
121 Utah 134. 239 P.2d 210, 213 (1952); Falula Famia, 866 P.2d at 571. See also Utah
Code Ann. § 10-8-8.5 (Supp.1993) (vacating
of public roadway dedicated to public use by
proprietor terminates city's determinable fee
therein). Conversely, where a municipality
owns the underlying fee to a roadway, proper
vacation of such would not change the municipality's right to the underlying fee. Sears,
572 ?2d at 1363.
While City may hold the Roadway in fee
simple, that interest is held in trust. Thus,
even if City as trustee had (or could have)
properly vacated the Roadway, City's interest would still be held in trust and not in
absolute ownership. This brings us to
whether or not City properly vacated the
Roadway.
NOTICE TO VACATE
[5] Landowners claim City did not properly vacate the Roadway because it did not
provide proper statutory notice to abutting
landowners and City's other occupants.
A municipality may not vacate a street
unless it has provided proper notice pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 10^8-3.4 (1992). Notice is given "by publishing in a newspaper
published or of general circulation in such
city once a week for four consecutive weeks
preceding action on such petition or intention
3.

A fee simple determinable expires automatically on the occurrence of a stated event. See
Black's Law Dictionary 615-16 (6th ed. 1990).
Thus, where a municipality has a determinable
fee in a roadway, common law provides that the
limited fee ends when the roadway is vacated.
See Falula Farms v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 569, 571
(Utah App.1993). Unlike the situation here a

. . . and by mailing such notice to all owners
of record of land abutting the street or alley
proposed to be vacated
" Id. See oho
Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595, 597 (Utah
1974) (purported vacation of roadway nullity
where no notice given to abutting landowners
or general public); Boskovich v. Midvcde
City Corp., 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435, 437
(1952) (improper vacation of street and alley
denied abutting landowners due process);
Tooele City v. Elkingion, 100 Utah 485, 116
P.2d 406, 407. 410 (Utah 1941) (mayor could
not quitclaim alley by resolution to abutting
land owner in contravention of vacation statute even where land had been deeded to city
by federal government).
Here, City did not notify abutting landowners, nor did it notify its citizens generally
pursuant to statute. In fact, the single published notice ran after the purported vacation. Thus, City's notice was not only insufficient, it was untimely. As a result, any
purported vacation of the Roadway is a nullity. See Boskovich, 243 P.2d at 437. We
therefore reverse the court's conclusion that
City properly vacated the Roadway and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
CONCLUSION
We (1) hold that the Townsite Act conveyed the Roadway to City in trust only; (2)
hold that City never explicitly reserved the
Roadway or obtained a deed to the Roadway
pursuant to statute; (3) remand for consideration of City's role as trustee of the Roadway, with its attendant fiduciary duties to the
beneficiaries; and (4) reverse the court's determination that City properly vacated the
Roadway.
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.
(o
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municipality typically obtains a determinable fee
in roadways when the same are accepted thereby
pursuant to the final approval of a subdivision
plat. That was the case in Sears v. Ogden, 572
P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1977). Here, we determine that whether City's interest was that of a
determinable fee or a fee simple, the interest was
held only in trust.
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Randy Horiuchi
Brent Overson

SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE COUNTY
GOVERNMENT CENTER
2001 S. State Street

July 13,

Suite N2100
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Salt Lake City

Pb4fylCD I

Utah 84190-1000
Tel (801) 468-3350
Fax (801) 468-3535

Ms. Katie L. Dixon
County Recorder
Government Center, North Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Dear Ms. Dixon:
The Board of County Commissioners, at its meeting held this day, approved the
attached Ordinance #1270 - Vacation & Closure for North Union Avenue/1035 East
and 1115 East.
Said ordinance reflects action taken by the Commissioners on May 25, 1994. The
25' easement to the south of the Croxford property between 2240 South and the
closed portion of North Union Avenue will be a public right-of-way. It is the
county's responsibility to maintain the public right-of-way unless a maintenance
agreement is worked out with Hermes. Title to the land within the vacated roads
will revert as a matter of law to the abutting property owner (Hermes) upon
enactment of this ordinance. Compensation for the interest of the county in the
streets is being worked out between Hermes and the real estate office.
The ordinance has been published in a newspaper of general circulation.
Pursuant to the above, you are hereby directed to place same on record for no fee
and return the recorded document to the Commission Clerk.
Very truly yours,
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
SHERRIE SWENSEN, COUNTY CLERK

1

hfp
cc:

end.

Attorney/Kent Lewis
Real Estate/Roger Hillam
Public Works/Lonnie Johnson
2fey
envelopment Serv/Bill Marsh
Newspaper

Deput

ORDINANCE NO. /<£ 70

DATE

AN ORDINANCE VACATING PORTIONS OF NORTH UNION AVENUE, 1035 EAST AND
1115 EAST, AND PERMANENTLY CLOSING A PORTION OF NORTH UNION AVENUE,
ALL WITHIN THE UNION FORT PLAT.
The Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County ordains as
follows:
SECTION I.

Vacation and Closure Ordinance No. /<£ J$

is

enacted as follows:
1.

The following segments of North Union Avenue, 1035 East

and 1115 East, within the Union Fort Plat, a subdivision recorded
on January 13, 1857 in the Salt Lake County Recorders Office, are
hereby vacated:
Beginning at the southeast corner of Lot 1,
Block 9, Union Fort Plat, a subdivision
recorded 13 January 1857 in the office of the
Salt Lake County Recorder, and running thence
North 17° East 12 rods; thence North 73° West
10 rods, more or less, to a point South 17°
West 2 rods from the southwest corner of Lot
9, Block 12, Union Fort Plat; thence North 17°
East 2 rods to said southwest corner of Lot 9,
Block 12; thence South 73° East 32.5 rods to
the southeast corner of Lot 1, said Block 12;
thence South 17° West 2 rods, more or less, to
the old fort wall; thence South 73° East 15.41
rods, more or less, to a point North 25° East
15 feet, more or less, from the northeast
corner of Lot 23, Block 10, said Union Fort
Plat; thence South 25° West 15 feet, more or
less, to said northeast corner of Lot 23;
thence North 73° West 33 rods to the northwest
corner of Lot 13, said Block 10; thence South
17° West 12 rods to the southwest corner of
Lot 12, said Block 10; thence South 73° East
40.91 rods, more or less, to the southwest
corner of Lot 3, Block 11, said Union Fort
Plat; thence South 17° West 13 rods to the
southwest corner of Lot 6, Block 6, said Union
Fort Plat; thence South 73° East 25.5 rods to
the southeast corner of Lot 1, said Block 6;
thence South 31°48' West 19.45 feet along the
west line of 1300 East Street; thence North

73° West 30.11 rods, more or less, to a point
South 17° West 0.14 rods, more or less, from
the southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 7, said
Union Fort Plat; thence North 17° East 12.14
rods, more or less, to the northeast corner of
Lot 24, said Block 7; thence North 73° West 6
rods to the northeast corner of Lot 22, said
Block 7; thence North 17° East 25 feet; thence
North 73° West 12 rods; thence South 17° West
25 feet to the northwest corner of Lot 19,
said Block 7; thence North 73° West 18 rods to
the northwest corner of Lot 13, said Block 7;
thence South 17° West 12 rods to the southwest
corner of Lot 12, said Block 7; thence North
73° West 15 feet, more or less, to the old
fort wall and the East line of 1035 East
Street; thence North 17° East 15 rods, along
said wall and said East line of 1035 East
Street; thence North 73° West 4 rods to the
point of beginning. Contains 2.01 acres, more
or less, as described.
2.

The following segment of North Union Avenue within the

Union Fort Plat is hereby permanently closed:
Beginning at the southwest corner of Lot 6,
Block 7, Union Fort Plat, a subdivision
recorded 13 January 1857 in the office of the
Salt Lake County Recorder and running thence
North 17° East 12 rods to the northwest corner
of Lot 19, said Block 7; thence North 17° East
25 feet; thence North 73° West 25 feet; thence
South 17° West 223 feet to the South line of
said Block 7; thence South 73° East 25 feet to
the point of beginning.
Contains:
0.128
acres.
3.

That the segment of North Union Avenue described in

paragraph 2 is being closed rather than vacated in order that Salt
Lake County may convey an access easement over said property to
Hermes Associates Ltd., the adjacent property owner on the north,
and to the owners of lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, 20, 21, and 22, Fort
Union Plat, the adjacent property owners on the south ("south
2

property

owners"),

which

will

allow better

access

to

their

respective properties than by having the property revert as a
matter of law, half to each by vacation; that the south property
owners will still have direct access to 7240 South and will be
provided additional access to the north side of the properties from
7240 South through a 25 foot wide public right-of-way which will be
conveyed by Hermes Associates Ltd. to Salt Lake County.

The 25

foot public right-of-way will revert to Hermes Associates, Inc. in
the event it acquires the south properties.
4.

The segments of the described streets being vacated

include any additional area within the streets as they exist on the
ground except as to the segment of North Union Avenue described in
paragraph 2, which is being closed rather than vacated.
5.

This ordinance is based upon a finding by the Board of

County Commissioners that due and proper notice of the hearing to
vacate the particular portions of said public highways was duly
given according to law; that the segments of said public highways
being vacated and the segment being closed are not needed as a
public highway or a public right-of-way; that the vacation and
closure will not be detrimental to the interest of Salt Lake County
or to the general public; that neither the public nor any person
will be materially injured thereby and that the vacation and
closure of said highways accordingly is appropriate and should be
done.

3

6.

All right, title and interest in and to the said portion

of said public highways being vacated is to revert by operation of
law to the abutting property owners or owners.
7.
record

The Salt Lake County Recorder is hereby directed to
this ordinance and make the necessary changes on the

official plats and records of the County to reflect the same,
8.

This ordinance shall have no force or effect upon any

easement or right-of-way for public utilities, holders of existing
public franchises, water drainage easements, pipeline easements or
other uses as presently exist under, over or upon the vacated
portion of said public highways or as may be shown on the official
plats and records of the County.
SECTION II.

This ordinance shall become effective 15 days

after the date of its enactment upon one publication in a newspaper
in and having general circulation in Salt Lake Coupty.
APPROVED and ADOPTED this

*4tt

/§

day of

1994.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

Date

ATTEST:

>alt Lake County Cler

att.rt-unionvac.ks1

Commissioner Bradley voting "Hay"
Commissioner Horiuchi voting"Ave"
Commissioner Overson voting "AVP"
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EXHIBIT L

RECEIVED
Salt Lake County
Board of Commissioners
Jim Bradley CHAIRMAN
Randy Horiuchi
Brent Overson

AUG 1 2 1994
SALT LAKE COUNTY
DEVELOPMENT SERVICE

SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE COUNTY
GOVERNMENT CENTER
2001 S. State Street
Suite N2100

August 1 0 ,

Salt Lake City

1994

Utah 84190-1000
Tel (801) 468-3350
Fax (801) 468-3535

Ms. Katie L. Dixon
County Recorder
Government Center, North Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Dear Ms. Dixon:
The Board of County Commissioners, at its meeting held this day, approved the
attached CORRECTED ORDINANCE #1275 - vacating portions of North Union Avenue,
1035 East and 1115 East and Closing a Portion of North Union Avenue.
The corrected ordinance vacates portions of North Union Avenue, 1035 East & 1115
East and permanently closing a portion of North Union Avenue.
The original
ordinance #1270 was approved July 13, 1994, and incorrectly described the portion
of North Union Avenue being closed.
The ordinance has been published in a newspaper of general circulation.
Pursuant to the above, you are hereby authorized to place same on record for no
fee and return the recorded document to the Commission Clerk.
Very truly yours,
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
SHERRIE SWENSEN, COUNTY CLERK

Deputy C.
hfp
cc:

Attorney/Kent Lewis
Attorney/Reiko
Public Works/Lonnie Johnson
^Envelopment Serv/Bill Marsh
U.S. Post Office
Address Program Support Office
1760 West 2100 South #130
SLC, UT 84199
end.
Newspaper

CORRECTED ORDINANCE NO.

1275

DATE

August 10, 1994

Superseding Ordinance No. 1270
Recorded in Book 6981, Page 0671
AN ORDINANCE VACATING PORTIONS OF NORTH UNION AVENUE, 1035 EAST AND
1115 EAST, AND PERMANENTLY CLOSING A PORTION OF NORTH UNION AVENUE,
ALL WITHIN THE UNION FORT PLAT.
The Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County ordains as
follows:
SECTION I.

Vacation and Closure Ordinance No.

1275

is

enacted as follows:
1.

The following segments of North Union Avenue, 1035 East

and 1115 East, within the Union Fort Plat, a subdivision recorded
on January 13, 1857 in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, are
hereby vacated:
Beginning at the southeast corner of Lot 1,
Block 9, Union Fort Plat, a subdivision
recorded 13 January 1857 in the office of the
Salt Lake County Recorder, and running thence
North 17° East 12 rods; thence North 73° West
10 rods, more or less, to a point South 17°
West 2 rods from the southwest corner of Lot
9, Block 12, Union Fort Plat; thence North 17°
East 2 rods to said southwest corner of Lot 9,
Block 12; thence South 73° East 32.5 rods to
the southeast corner of Lot 1, said Block 12;
thence South 17° West 2 rods, more or less, to
the old fort wall; thence South 73° East 15.41
rods, more or less, to a point North 25° East
15 feet, more or less, from the northeast
corner of Lot 23, Block 10, said Union Fort
Plat; thence South 25° West 15 feet, more or
less, to said northeast corner of Lot 23;
thence North 73° West 33 rods to the northwest
corner of Lot 13, said Block 10; thence South
17° West 12 rods to the southwest corner of
Lot 12, said Block 10; thence South 73° East
40.91 rods, more or less, to the southwest
corner of Lot 3, Block 11, said Union Fort
Plat; thence South 17° West 13 rods to the
southwest corner of Lot 6, Block 6, said Union
Fort Plat; thence South 73° East 25.5 rods to
the southeast corner of Lot 1, said Block 6;

thence South 31°48/ West 19.45 feet along the
west line of 13 00 East Street; thence North
73° West 30.11 rods, more or less, to a point
South 17° West 0.14 rods, more or less, from
the southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 7, said
Union Fort Plat; thence North 17° East 12.14
rods, more or less, to the northeast corner of
Lot 24, said Block 7; thence North 73° West 6
rods to the northeast corner of Lot 22, said
Block 7; thence North 17° East 25 feet; thence
North 73° West 12 rods; thence South 17° West
25 feet to the northwest corner of Lot 19,
said Block 7; thence North 73° West 18 rods to
the northwest corner of Lot 13, said Block 7;
thence South 17° West 12 rods to the southwest
corner of Lot 12, said Block 7; thence North
73° West 15 feet, more or less, to the old
fort wall and the East line of 1035 East
Street; thence North 17° East 15 rods, along
said wall and said East line of 1035 East
Street; thence North 73° West 4 rods to the
point of beginning. Contains 2.01 acres, more
or less, as described.
2.

The following segment of North Union Avenue within the

Union Fort Plat is hereby permanently closed:
Beginning at the northwest corner of Lot 19,
Block 7, Union Fort Plat, a subdivision
recorded 13 January 1857 in the office of the
Salt Lake County Recorder and running thence
South 73° East 12 rods to the northeast corner
of Lot 22, said Block 7; thence North 17° East
25 feet; thence North 73° West 12 rods; thence
South 17° West 25 feet to the point of
beginning.
3.

That the segment of North Union Avenue described in

paragraph 2 is being closed rather than vacated in order that Salt
Lake County may convey an access easement over said property to
Hermes Associates Ltd., the adjacent property owner on the north,
and to the owners of lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, 20, 21, and 22, Fort
Union Plat, the adjacent property owners on the south ("south
2

property

owners"),

which

will

allow

better

access

to their

respective properties than by having the property revert as a
matter of law, half to each by vacation; that the south property
owners will still have direct access to 7240 South and will be
provided additional access to the north side of the properties from
7240 South through a 25 foot wide public right-of-way which will be
conveyed by Hermes Associates Ltd. to Salt Lake County,

The 25

foot public right-of-way will revert to Hermes Associates, Inc. in
the event it acquires the south properties.
4.

The segments of the described streets being vacated

include any additional area within the streets as they exist on the
ground except as to the segment of North Union Avenue described in
paragraph 2, which is being closed rather than vacated.
5.

This ordinance is based upon a finding by the Board of

County Commissioners that due and proper notice of the hearing to
vacate the particular portions of said public highways was duly
given according to law; that the segments of said public highways
being vacated and the segment being closed are not needed as a
public highway or a public right-of-way; that the vacation and
closure will not be detrimental to the interest of Salt Lake County
or to the general public; that neither the public nor any person
will be materially injured thereby and that the vacation and
closure of said highways accordingly is appropriate and should be
done.
6.

All right, title and interest in and to the said portion

of said public highways being vacated is to revert by operation of
3

law to the abutting property owners or owners.
7.

The Salt Lake County Recorder is hereby directed to

record this ordinance and make the necessary changes on the
official plats and records of the County to reflect the same.
8*

This ordinance shall have no force or effect upon any

easement or right-of-way for public utilities, holders of existing
public franchises, water drainage easements, pipeline easements or
other uses as presently exist under, over or upon the vacated
portion of said public highways or as may be shown on the official
plats and records of the County.
SECTION II.

This ordinance supersedes Ordinance 1270 which

incorrectly described the portion of North Union Avenue being
permanently closed.
SECTION III.

This ordinance shall become effective 15 days

after the date of its enactment upon one publication in a newspaper
in and having general circulation in Salt Lake County.
APPROVED and ADOPTED this

10th day of

August

, 1994.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

ATTEST:
Chairman

Salt Lake County Clerk
ttt.rt.wpdocj.uaiooimd.ksi
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Commissioner Bradley voting ,fNay"
Commissioner Horiuchi voting"Ave"
Commissioner Overson voting "Ave"

